

Partisan Logic of Women's Suffrage

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Abstract

Women voted at rates lower than men in all the first elections that followed their enfranchisement before 1945. This observation may seem innocuous but it suggests something important about the reasons suffrage was extended to women, specifically, that these extensions may not have enjoyed widespread support among women themselves. This fact is consistent, in turn, with an explanation in which suffrage was strategically extended by male party leaders in pursuit of their electoral goals. We develop a model which implies that male politicians extend suffrage and women to vote at low rates when party leaders believe that (i) the support for their suffrage among women for suffrage is not too low and (ii) this support is concentrated among the partisan opponents of the extending party. The first point is banal but the second, we believe, is novel.

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"In all the arguments about the woman's vote, there existed one question which loomed large in the politician's mind. For which party, the right or the left, would women vote?" (Grimshaw 1972: 62)

1 Introduction

Women voted at rates lower than men in all the first elections that followed their enfranchisement before 1945. This observation may seem innocuous but it suggests something important about the reasons suffrage was extended to women, specifically, that these extensions may not have enjoyed widespread support among women themselves. This fact is consistent, in turn, with an explanation in which suffrage was strategically extended by male party leaders in pursuit of their electoral goals.

We argue that the driving force behind extensions of suffrage to women, at least before international norms may have overwhelmed internal political considerations (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997), was electoral competition, simple partisan logic. The argument goes as follows:

(1) Decisions to extend political rights could be made by only those who already enjoy them. Hence, to explain the steps by which suffrage was extended from the narrow elite of wealthy men to all men and women, one must understand the motives of those who were at each step legally qualified to make these decisions. This much is true with regard to extensions along the lines of class as well those of gender: the point of departure of any explanation of women's suffrage must be that it was extended by men, simply because only men had the right to make this decisions.

(2) While all steps toward more inclusive political institutions dilute the power of incumbents, enfranchisement of women followed a logic different from extensions of suffrage across class lines. Extensions to lower classes resulted from decisions by wealthy elites to accept the eventual distributional consequences in exchange for whatever economic or political benefits extensions would bring. These benefits may have included higher productivity (Justman and Gradstein 1999), higher spending on public goods (Lizzeri and Persico 2004), or demobilization of revolutionary threats (Bendix and Rokkan 1962, Przeworski and Cortés 1971, Freeman and Snidal 1982, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, Jack and Lagunoff 2003, Ticchi and Vindigni 2006, Xi 2012). Even if the extant holders of political rights may have differed in their fears of redistribution or perceptions of the eventual benefits, they were united in the face of the threat presented by the disenfranchised (Conley and Temini 2001). Extensions along the lines of class were not driven by electoral competition because political divisions within the restricted male electorates were not yet crystallized in terms of electoral parties (Rosenblum 2008, Przeworski 2011).¹ Once, however, male

¹Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) considered but rejected the possibility that these extensions were driven by partisan reasons in the cases they studied, while Lizzeri and Persico (2004) ruled out electoral considerations by an assumption. Llavador and Oxoby (2005) thought that

suffrage became extensive and male holders of political rights were organized by mass political parties competing to conquer office by winning votes, the quest for partisan support became the preponderant consideration. This quest drove partisan politicians to look at the possibility of increasing their support by gaining votes from women.

(3) If parties seek to maximize their political influence, of which we think in terms of vote shares, any party wants to enfranchise women if it expects that the share of the vote it would receive from them would be larger than its share among the male electorate. Hence, beliefs of male politicians about the electoral postures of women drive decisions about extending suffrage to them. In turn, the views and the actions of women inform the male party leaders about the eventual political consequences of the extension. We thus argue that decisions to extend suffrage to women were made by male politicians observing the protagonism of women, in pursuit of partisan or more broadly political support.

(4) To focus on women attitudes, we assume that male politicians believed that (i) the partisan preferences of women are not different from those of men, (ii) men do not care about women suffrage per se and their voting patterns would not be affected by the inclusion of women in the electorate, (iii) women would vote retrospectively in reaction to the extension, in favor of the extending party if they supported their suffrage and against it if they opposed it. Under these assumptions, the decisive feature of the historical situations is the correlation between women's partisan attitudes and their postures toward enfranchisement. Specifically, when the support for suffrage is concentrated among partisan opponents of the extending party, some women who would have voted against it on the partisan dimension alone are torn between their partisan preferences and the gratitude for the extension, and end up not voting. Moreover, some partisans of the extending party who are opposed to the extension also abstain. Hence, turnout of women is lower than that of men. In turn, when this correlation is sufficiently negative, the share of women's vote for the extending party is higher than its share among men. In sum, these assumptions imply that male politicians extend suffrage and women to vote at low rates when party leaders believe that (i) the support for their suffrage among women for suffrage is not too low and (ii) this support is concentrated among the partisan opponents of the extending party. The first point is banal but the second, we believe, is novel.

Why study women suffrage? We believe that getting the story of extensions right is important in itself. The literature on women's posture toward suffrage tends to be hagiographic rather than analytical, implicitly assuming that suffrage was conquered as a result of heroic protagonism of eminent suffragettes.² Among the first 100 titles listed under "Suffrage" in Amazon (December 27,

a party of industrialists would extend suffrage to workers in order to obtain a mandate for pursuing industrialization policies, while a party of landowners may want to block such policies by enfranchising peasants in addition to workers. Their model, however, focuses on whether extensions were partial or universal, rather than on whether they occur at all. Only Collier (1999) interprets extensions by class in electoral terms.

²This claim is explicit in Oldfield's (1992) history of female suffrage in Australia but her evidence is not systematic.

2012), all but nine concern women’s suffrage, and fifty-five are devoted to pro-suffrage movements or their prominent participants, with titles such as *How Women Won Their Rights*, *Winning the Vote: The Triumph of the American Women’s Suffrage Movement*, *With Courage and Cloth: Winning the Fight for a Woman’s Right to Vote*, and the like. Not accidentally, almost all these books concern the United States or the United Kingdom. Yet in many countries suffrage was extended to women with little controversy. While in some cases the struggle for women’s suffrage did indeed entail militancy and sacrifice, as Sulkunen (1989: 179) observed, “Countries with the most militant suffragetism had to wait for years, even decades, before they could enjoy the fruits of their struggle, while many small, peripheral countries gave women full parliamentary representation at an early date without much ado.” And where political rights were extended to women early and without much activism on their part, women did not need to fight to conquer them. Hence, countries where women were most militant were those where governing parties did not expect to gain votes from extensions. Identifying the direction of causality matters because it casts a broader light on the history of women’s movements.

Beyond this narrow focus, the paper contributes to the literature on suffrage extensions by showing that different kinds of extensions may have had different causal dynamics (Przeworski 2009). More broadly, by specifying how the self-interest of those who control the extant institutions leads them to institutional reforms, the paper elucidates one mechanism of endogenous institutional change (Greif and Laitin 2004, Przeworski forthcoming, Tang 2011). But perhaps most intriguing are the implications of our analysis for the general class of rights which are opposed by some of the eventual holders: women opposing the Equal Rights Amendment in the U.S. as well as liberalization of divorce or abortion rights in many countries; poor people of either sex opposing extensions of social rights because of racial or ethnic divisions; people in general resisting freedom of speech because they believe that some speech should not be public, and so on. Our explanation of extensions of political rights to women should apply to the general class of such instances: political parties have an interest in extending rights about which the potential holders are divided if the support for an extension is not too low but also when the support for these rights is concentrated among their partisan opponents.

We first summarize the facts that need to be explained, learning that the conditions under which extensions occurred are highly restricted. Then we propose a simple model of partisan calculus, in which parties extend suffrage to women if they expect to benefit politically from the extension. Given the observed shares of the extending parties and turnouts before and after extensions, the model permits us to identify the parameters of the distribution of women’s postures toward their suffrage. Finally, because the entire argument is based on rather cavalier assumptions, we examine their validity in the light of, albeit scarce, historical evidence. Supplementary materials provide evidence about the particular cases.

2 Some Facts

While both Condorcet³ and Bentham⁴ saw no reason why women would be any less competent to vote than men, and while J.S. Mill moved in the Commons to give votes to women in 1867, only in one country were women granted the right to vote in national elections before 1900. In many European and Latin American countries they gained this right only after World War II. Indeed, in some countries women were enfranchised only in the twenty-first century, most recently in Kuwait in 2006.

The first country in which women could vote on the same basis as men in national elections was New Zealand in 1893,⁵ followed by Australia in 1902, Finland in 1907 and Norway in 1913. Eleven previously existing countries and six countries newly independent ones adopted female suffrage between the two world wars. Yet still as of 1945, only one-half of the countries with any kind of suffrage enfranchised women on the same basis as men. With the proclamation by the United Nations in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which banned all kinds of discrimination and asserted equality of rights between men and women, all but three Muslim countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, and Maldives – that became independent after this date extended suffrage to all men and women.

Figure 1 summarizes this history, distinguishing the situations in which women were granted suffrage on the same bases as men from those in which women had to satisfy more restrictive criteria.⁶ Counting only those cases in which at least one election took place with suffrage restricted to males after a country became independent, altogether we observe seventy-three extensions to women, of which sixty-three were “full,” meaning that women qualified by the same criteria as men, and the remaining ten were “partial.”

³Condorcet (1986 [1785]: 293) observed “The reason for which it is believed that they [women] should be excluded from public function, reasons that albeit are easy to destroy, cannot be a motive for depriving them of a right which would be so simple to exercise [voting], and which men have not because of their sex, but because of their quality of being reasonable and sensible, which they have in common with women.”

⁴Bentham supported full civil and political rights for women but became discouraged by 1827, concluding that “the prepossession against their admission is at present too general, and too intense, to afford any chance in favor of a proposal for their admission.” See Williford (1975).

⁵Not counting the Isle of Man, which in spite of its name, allowed propertied women to vote in 1866 (Butler and Templeton 1984). Among places where suffrage was regulated at a subnational level, the territory of Wyoming was the first to institute universal suffrage in 1869. In some countries women could vote earlier in municipal elections: in Sweden unmarried women could participate as of 1863 and in the rural communes of Finland as of 1868. (Törnudd 1968: 30). For a review of women voting at subnational levels see Markoff (2003).

⁶Note that in some cases women had to satisfy the same requirements as men but everyone’s suffrage was still restricted by income or literacy criteria: for example, in Ecuador women acquired an equal right to vote in 1929 but suffrage was limited to literates. In turn, the additional conditions imposed on women may have been more or less restrictive: in Canada in 1917 the only women who could vote were nurses and relatives of the military who served overseas while in the United Kingdom in 1918 women had to be at least 30 years old and satisfy property criteria while all males could vote at the age of 21.




Figure 1

Granting women the vote was inconceivable before 1860 and almost inevitable after 1948. Within this window, extensions followed some regularities:

(1) Early extensions occurred in predominantly Protestant democracies and were implemented by governments on the relative Left of the political spectrum.

(2) In predominantly Catholic democracies women suffrage was adopted later, by parties ranging across the partisan spectrum.


(3) Extensions in predominantly Catholic dictatorships occurred on the average at the same time as in Catholic democracies but earlier than in dictatorships in predominantly Muslim countries.

The timing with regard to religions, the partisan identities of the extending governments, and regimes are shown in Figure 2.⁷ We code the extending party as Left (L) or Right (R) by the partisan identity of the chief executive and as Unanimous (U) where the government spanned the partisan spectrum. Note that in many cases the vote for the extension in the legislatures or constitutional assemblies was overwhelming and sometimes unanimous. Yet the fact that opposition parties supported an extension does not imply that they would have extended had they been in power: once it was clear that the extension would be

⁷The data on religions are from Robert Barro and Rachel M. McCleary (scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data) for 1900, 1970, and 2000. They were interpolated and extrapolated. The data on regimes are derived from the PIPE data set (<https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/adam-przeworski>). Other data were collected originally for this paper. The year of extension is the year in which the legal act was adopted, not the year of first elections in which women voted (except for Sweden, Greece, and Costa Rica, where extension is coded a year later because following the extension there was still an election in which women could not yet vote).

adopted, opposition parties may have feared offending the women who would vote in the subsequent elections, so they had to go along.

Timing of extensions by religions, regimes, and extending party



Full extensions only. Extending parties in democracies are coded by the party of the chief executive, as Left (L) or Right (R) unless the government spanned the partisan spectrum or was non-partisan, which is indicated by U. Extending dictators are indicated by D.

Given that during the periods under consideration the proportion of non-Christians in democracies was minuscule, the non-Catholics in the left panel of Figure 2 are almost exclusively Protestants. In turn, given that there were no dictatorships in Protestant countries when extensions took place, the non-Catholics in the right panel are almost exclusively Muslim.

To address the central question of the paper, we must limit the analysis to countries where women were politically free to agitate for and against suffrage, and where elections were reasonably clean before and after the extension. Because of the sixty-three full extensions, twenty-seven took place when either the previous or the subsequent election took place under a dictatorship or was patently fraudulent, this criterion immediately reduces the historical scope of our analysis. Moreover, because data on turnout of men and women is available separately for only a few countries, to make inferences based on the aggregate change of turnout between the last election in which suffrage was restricted to

males and the first in which women voted on equal bases, we must exclude instances in which extensions to women were accompanied by massive extensions to men, as in Bolivia in 1951. Finally, in a few cases which satisfy the above criteria, turnout data are not available for at least one of the two elections. We thus end with nineteen cases, concentrated among today's developed democracies. Table 1 provides the background information about these cases.

Table 1: Cases for which the difference in turnout is observed

	Extender	Country year religion	Δ turnout	Turnout	Turnout
				men	women
	L	New Zealand 1893 P	-5.1	77.4	69.1
	L	Australia 1902 P	-3.9	56.5	43.5
	L	Norway 1913 P	-6.9	68.4	50.5
	L	Denmark 1915 P	1.0	84.0	67.6
	L	Germany 1918 P	-1.9		
	R	Canada 1918 1/2	-7.3		
	L	Sweden 1919 P	-1.1	62.0	57.2
	R	Netherlands 1919 1/2 ^a	0.2		
	L	United States 1920 P	-12.4		
	R	United Kingdom 1928 P	-0.7		
	U	France 1945 C	-3.1		
	U	Japan 1945	-10.7		
	U	Hungary 1945 C	2.9		
	L	Argentina 1947 C	4.6		
	U	Belgium 1948 C	4.1		
	L	Chile 1949 C	10.7		
	L	Greece 1953 C	-0.4		
	L	Mexico 1953 C	-2.4		
	U	Laos 1957	6.5		

Note: Extender is coded as L or R according to relative location on the political spectrum of the party of the chief executive and as U when the government spanned the ideological spectrum. Religions are coded as P if the proportion Protestant > 0.6 and Catholic < 0.4, they are coded as C if proportion Protestant < 0.4 and Catholic > 0.6, coded as 1/2 if both proportions are in the range [0.4, 0.6], and not coded when the Protestant-Catholic distinctions was irrelevant. Δ turnout is the change in turnout between last election in which only males could vote and the first in which women voted. Turnout of men and women is for the first election following an extension. *a* Voting was compulsory.

These facts must constrain any explanation of extensions of suffrage to women in democracies. Why is it that first extensions were implemented by Left governments in Protestant countries? Why is it that women were enfranchised later in the Catholic countries and the late extenders ranged across the partisan spectrum? And, most importantly, why did turnout fall after almost

all extensions? How did women gain suffrage if they were not as disposed to use it as were men?

3 A Partisan Calculus of Extensions

3.1 Assumptions

There are two parties (coalitions, "political families"): $j \in \{L, R\}$. Consider first only the parties' vote share from a unit mass of male voters. Each voter i has a partisan preference x_i , where $x_i > 0$ if a voter prefers the Left and $x_i < 0$ if he prefers the Right, $x_i \sim N(\mu_x, 1)$. We refer to x as the "partisan" dimension. Voting entails a cost $c > 0$, the same for all individuals. Hence, i votes Left if $x_i > c$, votes Right if $x_i < -c$, and abstains otherwise. The share of the Left among the male electorate is thus

$$V_M^L = \frac{L_M}{L_M + R_M} = \frac{1 - F(c; \mu_x)}{1 - F(c; \mu_x) + F(-c; \mu_x)} \quad (1)$$

and the share of the Right is

$$V_M^R = \frac{R_M}{L_M + R_M} = \frac{F(-c; \mu_x)}{1 - F(c; \mu_x) + F(-c; \mu_x)}, \quad (2)$$

where $L_M = 1 - F(c; \mu_x)$ and $R_M = F(-c; \mu_x)$ are respectively the proportions of the male electorate voting Left and Right, given the threshold c in a normal distribution with the mean μ_x and unit variance. Note that the denominators of these fractions represent turnout.

Our central hypothesis is that parties extend suffrage if their leaders believe that their vote share among women would be higher than that among men. To decide whether or not to extend, party leaders must form beliefs about women's partisan postures, about the attitudes of male voters toward the extension⁸, and about the eventual reactions of women to the extension. To focus on women's postures toward their suffrage, we assume that party leaders expect that (1) women's partisan preferences are the same as those of men, (2) men are neutral about women suffrage, (3) men vote the same way whether or not women have the right to vote. The validity of these assumptions is examined below.

The big question for the male party leaders is whether women would reward or punish the extending party. To assess the effect of an extension on their vote share, male party leaders must form expectations about women's preferences with regard to their suffrage. Letting the posture of woman i toward suffrage be y_i , $y_i > 0$ if a woman supports suffrage and $y_i < 0$ if she opposes, the distribution of y is $y_i \sim N(\mu_y, 1)$. The relation between y_i and x_i is then

⁸There are several models male voters anticipate that an extension to women would result in some economic benefits for men. See Bertocchi (2011), Doepke and Tertilt (2009), Fernández (2010).

$$E(y_i|x_i) = E(y) + \rho(x_i - E(x)) = \mu_y + \rho x_i - \rho \mu_x = \mu_y + \rho(x_i - \mu_x). \quad (3)$$

Given the partisan distribution of males, which politicians observe from the results of elections with suffrage restricted to men, party leaders must thus form beliefs about the position of the average woman with regard to suffrage and about the relation of women's postures toward suffrage to their partisan preferences, namely whether women's support (opposition) to suffrage is concentrated among their own partisan supporters or their partisan opponents. It bears emphasis that μ_y and ρ represent beliefs, often not more than intuitive guesses.

Finally, male politicians must hold beliefs about women's retrospective reactions to the extension. After suffrage was extended in New Zealand, for example, "Some women organizations urged women to remember the debt of gratitude they owed to those who supported the women's cause in Parliament," while "Liberal leaders ... tried to win women's support out of gratitude for the privilege the Government conferred them." (Grimshaw 1972: 97- 99). In several countries, parties claimed credit for the extension even though they had long opposed it and went along only when it was clear that women would vote (Maza Valenzuela 1995). We assume that male politicians believed that women would vote retrospectively, so that if the Left were to extend they would vote according to their value of $x_i + y_i$ and if the Right were to do it they would vote according to their value of $x_i - y_i$.

Given these beliefs, leaders of L expect that when L extends a woman will vote for it if $x_i + y_i = (1 + \rho)x_i + \mu_y - \rho\mu_x \geq c$ or if $x_i \geq (1 + \rho)^{-1}(c - \mu_y + \rho\mu_x) \equiv z(c)$, will vote R if $(1 + \rho)x_i + \mu_y - \rho\mu_x \leq -c$ or $x_i \leq (1 + \rho)^{-1}(-c - \mu_y + \rho\mu_x) \equiv z(-c)$, and not vote otherwise. In turn, when R extends, party leaders expect a woman to vote for L if $x_i - y_i = (1 - \rho)x_i - \mu_y + \rho\mu_x \geq c$ or if $x_i \geq (1 - \rho)^{-1}(c + \mu_y - \rho\mu_x) \equiv z(c)$, to vote R if $(1 - \rho)x_i - \mu_y + \rho\mu_x \leq -c$ or $x_i \leq (1 - \rho)^{-1}(-c + \mu_y - \rho\mu_x) \equiv z(-c)$, and not to vote otherwise.

Finally, note that a party can extend only if it is an incumbent, so that under perfect proportionality μ_x among men must be positive for the Left to be able to extend and negative for the Right to be able to do it.

Under these assumptions, the Left party extends if $V_W^L(extend) \geq V_M^L > 1/2$ or if

$$V_W^L(extend) = \frac{1 - F(z(c); \mu_x)}{1 - F(z(c); \mu_x) + F(z(-c); \mu_x)} \geq \frac{1 - F(c; \mu_x)}{1 - F(c; \mu_x) + F(-c; \mu_x)}, \mu_x > 0 \quad (4)$$

Analogously the Right extends if $V_W^R(extend) \geq V_M^R > 1/2$ or

$$V_W^R(extend) = \frac{F(z(-c); \mu_x)}{1 - F(z(c); \mu_x) + F(z(-c); \mu_x)} \geq \frac{F(-c; \mu_x)}{1 - F(c; \mu_x) + F(-c; \mu_x)}, \mu_x < 0 \quad (5)$$

3.2 Consequences

Proposition 1 *L extends under three sets of conditions: (1) if $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x - c)$ and $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x + c)$, (2) if $\rho(\mu_x + c) \leq \mu_y \leq \rho(\mu_x - c)$, which can be true only when $\rho < 0$, or (3) if $\rho(\mu_x - c) \leq \mu_y \leq \rho(\mu_x + c)$, which can be true only when $\rho > 0$. If $\rho > 0$, turnout of women is higher than that of men; if $\rho < 0$, it is lower than that of men. The conditions for R to extend are symmetric.*

Proof. In the Appendix. ■

Observe that a party may extend even when $\mu_y < 0$ – a majority of women opposes an extension – as long as the women who support suffrage are predominantly its partisan opponents. Here are the two intuitions behind these results:

(1) The obvious intuition is that parties extend suffrage when the opposition against it among women is not too large. The women who vote Left when L extends are those for whom $(1 + \rho)x_i + \mu_y - \rho\mu_x > c$, so that there are more such women when the average level of support among them is higher. In turn, the women who vote Right when L extends are those for whom $(1 + \rho)x_i + \mu_y - \rho\mu_x < -c$, so that there are fewer of them when more women support suffrage. R is also more prone to extend when μ_y is larger: its voters when it extends are those for whom $x_i - y_i = (1 - \rho)x_i - \mu_y + \rho\mu_x < -c$, which increases in μ_y , while the Left voters are those for whom $x_i - y_i = (1 - \rho)x_i - \mu_y + \rho\mu_x > c$, which declines in μ_y .

(2) The second intuition is that when the women supporting suffrage are concentrated among partisan opponents some women who would have voted on the partisan dimension alone abstain when a party extends. Consider the women who would have voted R on the partisan dimension alone, those with $x_i < -c$. If L extends, they vote R only if $x_i + y_i = x_i + \mu_y + \rho(x_i - \mu_x) < -c$. Given that for these women $x_i - \mu_x < 0$, for some $x_i + y_i > -c$ when $\rho < 0$. Some Right-wing ardent suffragettes may even vote L , but these will be few at most (a necessary condition is that they have $y_i > 2c$). Hence, the extending party can neutralize some partisan opposition. True, some partisans of the extending party also abstain if they are opposed to the extension. Because L partisans are those with $x_i > c$, for them $x_i - \mu_x > 0$ so that when $\rho < 0$, some of them do abstain. Hence, when $\rho < 0$, turnout of women is lower than that of men. In turn, if supporters of suffrage are also partisans of the extending party, some women who would have abstained on the partisan dimension alone become partisan voters, so that turnout of women is higher than that of men.

Suppose then that L is in office, which means that $\mu_x > 0$ and assume that the median male is a non-voter, $c > \mu_x$. The solid line in Figure 3 shows the share of L among men, while the other lines show its share among women as a function of the correlation. When party leaders expect that women are clearly opposed to suffrage (long dash line), L never extends, and when they expect strong support (short dash line) it always extends. When women are more divided about suffrage, it matters which among them favor the extension




Figure 1: Figure 3: Left shares among women and men as a function of ρ and μ_y .

and which are opposed: L extends at lower expected levels of support if party leaders believe that the women favoring suffrage are opposed to it on partisan grounds.

Turnout of women is lower than that of men when ρ is low and it is higher when ρ is high.

The main conclusions of this analysis are thus that governing parties extend suffrage to women when (1) the support for suffrage among women is not too low, and (2) when it is concentrated among partisan opponents.




Figure 2: Figure 4: Turnout among women and men as a function of ρ and μ_y .

4 Unravelling the Puzzle

Needless to say, history is more complex than any model, so with the few cases we have it is always possible that some combination of idiosyncratic factors could have produced the patterns we observe. All we can do is to report what we could glean from the available historical materials and leave the final judgement to the reader. We first discuss explanations rival to ours and then present evidence with regard to our model.

One explanation of the observed patterns could be that both the Left and the Right always wanted to extend but the Left was in office earlier than the Right, so it was the Left that could extend. Yet the Right had an ample opportunity before the Left entered office in New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Conversely, the Left had been in office and did not extend in several countries. Hence, this is not a plausible explanation of the timing patterns.

Another potential explanation concerns the effect of religions. Suppose that Protestant women do tend to vote Left while Catholic women tend to vote Right. If this is true, we should observe the Left extending in Protestant countries but not when it was in office in predominantly Catholic ones, while we would see the Right extending in predominantly Catholic countries but not in Protestant ones. To some extent this is true. In the two countries with a minoritarian but sizeable proportions of Catholics, Conservatives enfranchised women in Canada in 1917-8 even though Liberals had a chance to do it when they were in office between 1896 and 1911, while Catholics (AB) extended suffrage to women in Netherlands in 1919 even though Liberals controlled governments between 1913 and 1918. In predominantly Catholic countries, France and Belgium, Socialists did not use their tenure in government to enfranchise women. In France neither the *Cartel des Gauches* nor *Front Populaire* did it when they were in power during the inter-war period. In Belgium, Socialists were in office immediately before World War II, but women were enfranchised only by a grand coalition of Socialists and Catholics in 1948. Yet if it were true that women's preferences were shaped only by their religion, we would have observed early extensions by the Right in predominantly Catholic countries, and we do not. The story must be more complex.

Our model commits us to think that: (1) The Left extended when women were not too opposed to their suffrage and those women who supported it tended to lean Right on the partisan dimension. (2) Whenever the Left was in office and did not extend, the support for suffrage among women was weak or the women who supported the extension were predominantly Left on the partisan dimension, so that the Left had no additional votes to gain. (3) The Right extended when women were not too opposed to their suffrage and those women who supported it tended to lean Left on the partisan dimension. (4) Whenever the Right was in office and did not extend, the support for suffrage among women was insufficient or the women who supported suffrage were predominantly Right-wing partisans.

Now, where we have the relevant information, we can identify $\{c, \mu_x, \mu_y, \rho, \}$.

Let V_M^E stand for the extending party's share of the total vote among males, $E \in \{L, R\}$, E_M for the proportion of the male electorate that votes for the extending party, O_M for the proportion of the electorate that votes against the Extender, $T_M = E_M + O_M$ for turnout of the male electorate. Observing V_M^E and T_M in the election immediately preceding the extension we can identify μ_x and c .

$$V_M^E(\mu_x, c) = \frac{E_M(\mu_x, c)}{E_M(\mu_x, c) + O_M(\mu_x, c)}$$

$$T_M(\mu_x, c) = E_M(\mu_x, c) + O_M(\mu_x, c)$$

These are two equations with two unknowns. Once we have μ_x and c , we need to identify μ_y and ρ . Let the respective proportions in the joint male and female electorate in the election immediately following the extension be subscripted with $M + W$, so that

$$V_{M+W}^E(\mu_y, \rho | \mu_x, c) = \frac{E_{M+W}(\mu_y, \rho | \mu_x, c)}{E_{M+W}(\mu_y, \rho | \mu_x, c) + O_{M+W}(\mu_y, \rho | \mu_x, c)}$$

$$T_{M+W} = E_{M+W}(\mu_y, \rho | \mu_x, c) + O_{M+W}(\mu_y, \rho | \mu_x, c)$$

These are again two equations with two unknowns. Hence, if we have the information on the vote shares and turnout before and after the extension we can identify all the four parameters.

Using this procedure, we can form predictions with regard to most of the cases in Table 1.⁹ Note that the model predicts that $\rho < 0$ when the Left extends and $\rho > 0$ when the Right does.

Table 2: Model predictions about the distribution of women preferences

⁹These calculations are not made for all the cases listed in Table 1 because (1) vote shares are not informative when extensions were made by grand coalitions that fell apart after the extension, (2) the vote share of the extender cannot be determined unless the party system remained the same before and after the extension.

E		c	μ_x	$Left$	μ_y	Pro-suffrage	ρ
L	New Zealand 1893	0.25	0.12	54.8	-0.01	49.6	-0.32
L	Australia 1902	0.57	0.05	52.0	0.09	53.6	-0.28
L	Norway 1913	0.46	0.28	61.0	-0.01	49.6	-0.33
L	Germany 1918	0.20	-0.32	37.4	0.12	54.8	-0.23
L	Sweden 1919	0.60	0.03	51.0	0.03	51.2	-0.22
L	US 1920	0.51	0.03	51.2	-0.12	45.2	-0.38
L	Greece 1953	0.33	-0.32	37.4	0.16	56.4	-0.19
L	Mexico 1953	0.36	0.50	69.1	0.07	52.8	-0.40
L	Denmark 1915	0.33	0.16	56.4	0.00	50.0	-0.20
L	Argentina 1947	0.21	0.08	53.2	0.15	56.0	0.00
R	Canada 1918	0.35	-0.20	42.1	-0.19	42.5	0.35
R	Netherlands 1919	0.14	-0.02	49.2	-0.02	51.6	0.22
R	UK 1928	0.30	0.06	52.4	-0.10	46.0	0.22

E is the partisan identity of the extender. $Left = 1 - F_x(0; \mu_x)$ is the proportion of males voting Left. $Pro-suffrage = 1 - F_y(0; \mu_y)$ is the proportion of women supporting their suffrage. The parameters predict observed vote shares and turnouts within 0.01.

Given ρ , we can also partition the female voters by their partisanship and their postures toward suffrage (See the Appendix for details). To consider just two cases of postures toward suffrage, the distributions for the United States and Argentina are given in Tables 3.

Table 3A: Predicted distribution of partisan preferences and postures toward suffrage among women in the United States, 1920

Partisanship	Support	Oppose	Total
Democratic	17.2	34.0	51.2
Republican	28.0	20.8	48.8
Total	45.2	54.8	100

Table 3B: Predicted distribution of partisan preferences and postures toward suffrage among women in Argentina, 1947

Partisanship	Support	Oppose	Total
Peronist	29.8	23.4	53.2
Right	26.2	20.6	46.8
Total	56.0	44.0	100

5 Women's Postures and Actions

To evaluate these predictions, we need to consider evidence with regard to three aspects of women's postures: (1) the distribution of their preferences on the

Left-Right dimension, (2) the distribution of their preferences with regard to suffrage, and (3) the relation between these two dimensions, specifically, whether those women who support suffrage tend to support the Left or the Right on the partisan dimension. Note that what we need to know is not the actual distribution of women preferences but the expectations of male politicians with regard to them, expectations that may or may not have been correct. Because these politicians did speak and write, one source of information are historians' accounts of the beliefs of male political leaders. But we can also infer that when women were vociferous about their suffrage, on both sides of the issue, this information was available to everyone. Moreover, many prominent politicians were married to women who were vocal in support or against suffrage, so they learned at home. This is not to say that the signals were unambiguous. Most women, particularly in rural areas, were silent and they constituted the bulk of the potential female electorate. Hence, politicians often differed with regard to their expectations of the eventual female voting even within particular parties.

5.1 Left-Right (μ_x)

Male voters differ in their partisan preferences: this is why they vote for left or right parties. Partisan preferences of women may differ, in turn, from those of men. Lott and Kenny (1999), for example, argue that women are more risk-averse and are more prone to support social insurance policies (see also Abram and Settle 1999, Aidt and Dallal 2008). Male politicians diverged in their perceptions of women's partisanship: some saw them as having radical ideas but many thought they would support the established order. Most male politicians expected women to vote the same way their husbands did: indeed, one standard argument against women suffrage was that it would only duplicate the vote of married men. In turn, most pro-suffrage women movements declared themselves to be non-partisan, seeking male support wherever it might come from. In sum, except for the influence of Catholicism, male politicians did not see women as differing much in their partisan preferences from men. As Verney (1957: 205) reports with regard to Sweden, "The extension of the franchise to women seemed harmless enough, since it could be assumed that their vote would be distributed roughly in the same proportion as men's."

Catholicism was an exception in that party leaders shared a general perception that Catholic women would vote for Right parties on the partisan dimension because of the influence of the Church. The French Radical Party thought that Catholic women would be influenced by the Church and did nothing to advance their suffrage rights when it was in office in the 1920s (Therborn 1977, Lloyd 1971: 101). In Belgium in 1923, a Socialist male leader exclaimed that "If you give the vote to women, ... Belgium will become one large house of Capuchins (*capucinière*)" (Stenger 1990: 87). In Spain in 1931 even some women Socialists, notably Victoria Kent, opposed the extension for the same reason. According to Villars (2004: 152), in Honduras in 1952, "many legislators who voted against [women suffrage] did it because of their fear that women's vote would favor the Liberal Party." In Chile, "the delay in approving the project of the women's

suffrage law in the presidential and parliamentary elections was due to the resistance of anti-clerical parties: they feared that women's vote would alter the balance of electoral forces..." (Valenzuela 1995: Abstract).

5.2 Women's postures toward suffrage (μ_y)

Contrary to views that see women issues as a conflict between men and women, in all countries some of the opposition to suffrage originated from women themselves: women organized and militated on both sides of the issue. In the United States, state anti-suffrage organizations came together in 1911 to form the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage (NAOW). "Household Hints," its publication, urged a NO vote on Woman Suffrage, "BECAUSE 90% of the women either do not want it, or do not care. BECAUSE it means competition of women with men instead of co-operation. BECAUSE 80% of the women eligible to vote are married and can only double or annul their husband's votes. BECAUSE it can be of no benefit commensurate with the additional expense involved. BECAUSE in some States more voting women than voting men will place the Government under petticoat rule. BECAUSE it is unwise to risk the good we already have for the evil which may occur." In the United Kingdom, "Numerous public opinion polls throughout the suffrage campaign continued to find the majority of women not wanting a vote." (www.thesuffragettes.org/history/anti-suffrage, consulted December 18, 2012). Women's National Anti-Suffrage League was founded in 1908, with over 100 branches, and in 1910 merged with Men's League for Opposing Women's Suffrage, publishing the *Anti-Suffrage Review* (Bush 2007). In New Zealand, a group of Wellington women calling themselves the Anti-Women's Franchise League pressured the Governor General not to sign the extension bill. In Australia, a petition of thirty-four eminent women stated the reasons why they did not want the vote as follows: "Because the duties and life of men and women are divinely ordered to be different both in the State and in the home. Because the energies of women are engrossed by their present duties and interests from which men cannot relieve them. Because political equality will deprive women of special privileges hitherto enjoyed by the sex. Because suffrage logically involves the holding of public office, which is inconsistent with the duties of most women." (*South Australian Parliamentary Papers*, 1894, 38, In Her Own Name, p.159-160.) In Canada from 1894 to 1918, the National Council of Women of Canada promoted woman's political status yet without the vote: in the conception of "transcendent citizenship" for women the ballot was not needed, for citizenship was to be exercised through personal influence and moral suasion, through the election of men with strong moral character, and through raising public-spirited sons. In Switzerland in 1931 the The Swiss League Against Political Women's Suffrage took a petition to the Federal Council "Against the Politicization of Swiss Women." These public activities of women were self-defeating because of the paradoxical structure of the situation: women opposed to political participation could act against it only as participants. Yet they mattered because they indicated whether and how women would actually vote if they were to be

granted the right.

One may think that three factors influenced women's support: the gradual entrance of upper-class women into the workforce, the experience of other countries, and the shift of the position toward suffrage by the Catholic Church in 1919:

(1) Poor women were always forced to work in factories and fields, as domestic servants, and as prostitutes. But they were poor and illiterate, and would have been excluded by these criteria alone. Jobs for educated women became available only toward the end of the nineteenth century. Hence, the sociological hypothesis is that women suffrage became possible only when a sufficient number of upper-class women entered the public sphere by finding employment outside the household, typically as teachers, nurses, and physicians.

(2) The passage of women's suffrage in New Zealand, and then in Australia, Finland, and Norway, provided *prima facie* evidence that no cataclysms ensue when women acquire this right. It bears emphasis that these experiences were closely watched by suffragettes in other countries and cited by them as evidence that voting by women is feasible, has no negative effects on women's status in other realms of life, and no negative consequences for the extending parties. (Daley and Nolan 1994; Ramírez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997).

(3) Finally, the official posture of the Catholic Church changed abruptly in 1919 when Pope Benedict XV came in support of women suffrage (Lloyd 1971: 101) and several Catholic women organizations formed to promote it, presumably shifting the postures of Catholic women (Hause and Kenney 1981).

5.3 Which women supported suffrage? (ρ)

Little can be said on this issue in general. The leaders of the pro-suffrage women movement were almost invariably bourgeois women but so were the leaders of anti-suffrage movements. The postures of working-class women depended on the positions of Left-wing parties and trade unions as well as of the Catholic Church, and these varied across countries and periods.

6 Conclusions

To evaluate the predictions of the model, we must delve into particular cases, which for lack of space are included in Supplementary Materials. The overall conclusions derived from examining these cases are the following:

(1) The assumption that men vote the same way in the elections immediately preceding and following an extension is often violated. The reason, however, is not the impact of the presence of women but all kinds of idiosyncratic events surrounding the particular elections, often a simultaneous extension to lower class men.

(2) The assumption that rank-and-file male voters did not care about women suffrage cannot be tested. There are two cases in which only males could vote

in the election that followed immediately the legal act of extension – Sweden in 1920 and Greece in 1952 – and in both cases the extending coalition lost votes. These were, however, tumultuous times in both countries and many other events intervened. Moreover, in Argentina male support for the extending party increased after the extension. Perhaps more telling is the fact that enfranchising women was rarely, if ever, a prominent issue in the elections preceding extensions, dwarfed by economic conflicts, international conflicts, and other electoral issues, such as plural voting (Australia), voting by mail (New Zealand), or reforms of electoral systems (several countries).

(3) The estimates of μ_y seem plausible in the light of, albeit scarce, historical evidence, consisting of the history of previous women enfranchisement at the subnational level, some numbers gleaned from surveys, straw polls, or signatories of petitions, statements by male politicians, and whatever else that informs. The estimated low levels of support for suffrage among the American and the British women are striking, perhaps explaining the exceptional intensity of women militancy in these two countries.

(4) The estimates of ρ are next-to-impossible to evaluate in the light of direct historical evidence. It seems plausible, however, that these correlations were negative when neither Left parties nor trade-unions organized women in favor of suffrage and positive when they did or when the Catholic Church opposed suffrage. The highly negative correlation for Germany does not seem plausible but the two elections on the basis which it is identified were separated by a major war.

(5) While we have focused on democratic countries, in several cases suffrage was extended to women either by dictators or in the aftermath of anti-dictatorial coups or revolutions. While the logic of these extensions was not partisan, all the evidence indicates that it was broadly political: dictators sought support among women because of their fragile support among men (for example, General Stroessner in Paraguay in 1961) and anti-dictatorial coalitions sought support among women to distinguish themselves from the dictatorship. In Panama, suffrage was extended to women in 1946 because "Jiménez hoped that the new constitution would counter some of the support Panamanian women had given to the Arias camp since the 1940 campaign." (Percy 1998: 103). In Peru, "the right to vote was not a result of women's pressure but of the effort of a military leader, Gen. A. Odria, to obtain women's votes" (Vargas and Villanueva 1994: 579).

Without systematic evidence, conclusions must remain in the eyes of the beholder. In turn, we think that the model makes logical sense of a historical pattern that no rival theory explains. It cannot be that the Left extended early because it was in power before the Right, because the Right was in office earlier. It cannot be that the extensions depended only on the dominant religion because the Right did not extend when it was in office in Catholic countries. It cannot be that parties extended only when an overwhelming majority of women supported their suffrage, for turnout among women was lower than of men after most extensions. In turn, the observed patterns make sense if the

support of women for suffrage was not too low and concentrated among the partisan opponents of the extending party. This is when make politicians could believe that they would gain politically by enfranchising women and they did.

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8 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1

Lemma 2 *If $\rho > 0$, turnout of women is higher than that of men; if $\rho < 0$, it is lower.*

Proof. The men who do not vote are those for whom $-c < x_i < c$. In turn, when Left extends women do not vote if $-c < x_i + y_i = x_i + \mu_y + \rho(x_i - \mu_x) < c$. Hence, when $\rho > 0$, some women for whom $-c < \mu_x < x_i < c$ vote Left and some for whom $-c < x_i < \mu_x < c$ vote Right, so that the turnout of women is higher than that of men. If turn, when $\rho < 0$, some women for whom $x_i > c$ abstain if $x_i + \mu_y + \rho(x_i - \mu_x) < c$ and some women for whom $x_i < -c$ abstain if $x_i + \mu_y + \rho(x_i - \mu_x) > -c$, so that turnout of women is lower than that of men. ■

To examine the conditions under which $V_L^W \geq V_L^M$, we must study separately the conditions under which $L^W \geq L^M$ and under which $R^W \leq R^M$. There are three cases to consider: (1) When $L^W > L^M$ and $R^W < R^M$, that is, the

proportion of women voting Left is higher than that of men and the proportion of women voting Right is lower than that of men, V_L^W is unambiguously larger than V_L^M , (2) When $L^W < L^M$ and $R^W < R^M$, that is, both the proportions of women voting Left and Right are lower than the corresponding proportions of men, the effect on Left shares among women and men depends on additional conditions, and (3) the same is true when $L^W > L^M$ and $R^W > R^M$, that is, both the proportions of women voting Left and Right are higher than the corresponding proportions of men.

Let $z(c) = (1 + \rho)^{-1}(c - \mu_y + \rho\mu_x)$ and let $z(-c) = (1 + \rho)^{-1}(-c - \mu_y + \rho\mu_x)$. Then $z(c) \geq c$ if $\mu_y \leq \rho(\mu_x - c)$. Hence, the proportion of women voting L , $1 - F(z(c); \mu_x, 1)$, is at least as high as that of men, $1 - F(c; \mu_x, 1)$, if $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x - c)$. Analogously, the proportion of women voting R , $F(z(-c); \mu_x, 1)$, is not higher than the proportion of men, $F(-c; \mu_x, 1)$, if $z(-c) \leq -c$ or $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x + c)$.

Note that the median (=mean) male is a Left voter if $\mu_x > c > 0$ and he is an abstainer if $0 < \mu_x < c$. (He cannot be a Right voter, $\mu_x < -c$, because L would not be in office.)

L extends if any of the three pairs of conditions are satisfied, with different consequences for the mass of women voting Left and Right and thus for their turnout.

(1) $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x - c)$ and $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x + c)$. Under these conditions the mass of L voters among women is at least as high as among men and the mass of R voters among women is not higher than among men. If $\rho > 0$, these conditions are satisfied as long as $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x + c)$; If $\rho < 0$, they are satisfied as long as $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x - c)$. Note that if $\mu_x < c$ L extends only if $\mu_y > 0$ but if $\mu_x > c$, it extends even if $\mu_y < 0$ as long as $\rho < \mu_y / (\mu_x - c)$

(2) $\mu_y \leq \rho(\mu_x - c)$ and $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x + c)$: the mass of women voters for L is not higher than of men voters and the mass of R voters among women is not higher than among men. These conditions imply $\rho(\mu_x + c) \leq \mu_y \leq \rho(\mu_x - c)$, which is possible only if $\rho < 0$. If the median male is an abstainer, μ_y can be positive or negative; if he is a voter, $\mu_y < 0$. Because both the mass of Left and Right voters among women is smaller than among men, turnout of women is lower than that of men.

(3) $\mu_y \geq \rho(\mu_x - c)$ and $\mu_y \leq \rho(\mu_x + c)$: the mass of women voters for L is not lower than of men voters and the mass of R voters among women is not lower than among men. These conditions imply $\rho(\mu_x - c) \leq \mu_y \leq \rho(\mu_x + c)$, so that $\rho > 0$. If the median male is an abstainer, μ_y can be positive or negative; if he is a voter, $\mu_y > 0$. Because both the mass of Left and Right voters among women is larger than among men, turnout increases.

8.1 Partitioning Women Preferences

Under the ceteris paribus assumption, the proportion of women who supported the Right was $F_x(0; \mu_x, 1)$. In turn, given μ_y the proportion of women who opposed suffrage was $1 - F_y(0; \mu_y, 1)$. Given ρ , the proportion of women who supported the Right *and* opposed suffrage was $1 - F_y(\mu_y + \rho(x_i - \mu_x); \mu_y, 1) -$

$F_x(0; \mu_x, 1)$. Given the marginals and this cell, we can calculate the values of other cells.

8.1.1 United States

Male Republicans in 1916 were $F_x(0; 0.03, 1) = 0.488$, which we impute to males and females in 1920. Women who opposed suffrage in 1920 were $F_y(0; -0.12, 1) = 0.548$. Republican women who opposed suffrage were those for whom $y_i = -0.12 - 0.38(x_i - 0.03) \leq 0 | x_i < 0$ or those for whom $-0.286 \leq x_i \leq 0$, so their proportion in the female electorate was $1 - F_y(-0.286; -0.12, 1) - F_x(0; 0.03, 1) = 0.208$.

8.1.2 Argentina

The Proportion of Right-wing women was $F_x(0; 0.08, 1) = 0.468$, of women who opposed suffrage were $F(0; 0.15, 1) = 0.440$. $\rho = 0$, so that cell entries are products of the marginals.

9 Supplementary Materials

9.1 Introduction

These materials include only the cases for which we have turnout and party shares information and in which the partisan identity of the extending party or coalition can be identified. Background information about other cases is available on request.

In each case, we (1) briefly summarize the history of women suffrage prior to extensions at the national level as well as identify the extending party or coalition, (2) provide information about the shares of the extenders and turnouts in the last election preceding and the first following an extension, (3) provide any information we could glean concerning the general level of support for suffrage among women, and (4) provide any information we could glean concerning the distribution of this support relative to partisan divisions. Note that while one would expect women support for suffrage to be higher where women could vote at subnational levels prior to their enfranchisement in national elections, persistently lower turnout of women in local elections indicates a lower level of support. Information about the general level of support includes women turnout, numbers of female signatories of suffrage petitions, some straw polls or simulated elections, as well as perceptions of male politicians, and is generally scant. Information about the distribution of support for suffrage along the left-right dimension includes organizing efforts by parties, where relevant the posture of the Catholic Church, class composition of pro-suffrage women movements, any partisan statements by women leaders, and some electoral studies. Finally, we highlight caveats, if there are any, about our *ceteris paribus* assumptions.

Cases

New Zealand 1893

(1) **Reform.** Women tax payers could vote in municipal elections as of 1875. National level suffrage bill was passed in 1893 while a Liberal government was in office by a coalition of Liberal back-benchers and some leaders of the Opposition.

(2) **Electoral data.** Left (Liberal) share in 1890 was 56.1. Turnout in 1890 was 80.4. The share for 1893 is not available (Neither candidates nor elected representatives are identified by party in the electoral statistics.) Turnout in 1893 was 75.3. We also know (Grimshaw 1972: 138, ft. 38) numbers by sex, namely that the ratios of voters to adults were 77.4 for males and 69.1 for females.

Given that Liberal share for 1893 is not available, the parameters are identified under the assumption that it was the same as in 1890, but in fact Liberals increased their seats, so that μ_y may have been higher.

(3) **Mean.** The second of two petitions calling for suffrage was signed in 1892 by 20,274 women, which is 45 percent of the 45,000 wage earners and 15.5 percent of 130,654 adult women. There is no quantitative information

about women's opposition to suffrage, which did exist. The big unknown were country wives about whom we know nothing. Politicians were divided in their expectations: Liberal back-benchers and some Opposition legislators thought an extension would benefit the Left, the Liberal Ministry and much of the Opposition thought it would benefit the Right.

(4) **Correlation.** The initial impetus for suffrage originated from bourgeois women. They were the leaders throughout and they are the ones who exerted pressure on politicians from both parties. In 1891 they appealed to working class women and the Tailoresses Union came in support. It seems many of the signatories of the petitions were working class. There were no concerted efforts by Liberals or by male trade-unions to organize women.

Australia 1902

(1) **Reform.** Women could previously vote in some provinces, at the municipal level in South Australia as of 1861 and in the rest of the provinces as of 1884, and at the provincial level in South Australia as of 1894 and in Western Australia as of 1899. National level reform bill was passed in 1902 under the government of the Protectionist Party, with support of Labour.

(2) **Electoral data.** In 1901, the first national level election, the Protectionist Party won 36.8 percent and its ally, Labour, won 15.8 percent, with turnout of 56.7. In 1903, Protectionists received 34.4 percent and Labour 30.1, with turnout of 52.8. The shares of the extender are thus 52.6 in 1901 and 64.5 in 1903. Gender split of vote is available for the 1903 election. For the Senate election, turnout of men was 53.1 and of women it was 40.0 percent. For the House of Representatives, turnout of men was 56.5 and of women 43.5. The difference of 13 percent remained about constant until the 1910 election (Tingston, 1975: 33).

(3) **Mean.** The estimated support of women for suffrage is high. Given that women could previously vote in local elections, women suffrage was not particularly controversial. Oldfield (1992: 182) cites some local surveys among women, which indicate that they supported suffrage but these are just anecdotes.

(4) **Correlation.** Oldfield (1992) cites random facts that indicate that the leaders of the suffrage movement were bourgeois women but also that some supported Labour Party. This party, however, was passive about female suffrage, seeing as the priority the elimination of plural voting. Unions as well seem to have been ambivalent. There were no concerted efforts by Labour, Liberals, or trade-unions to organize women.

Norway 1913

(1) **Reform.** Some women were enfranchised to vote in municipal elections as of 1898. In 1907 the right to vote in national elections was extended to women who paid income taxes on incomes of at least 300 crowns in the country and 400 crowns in towns or who were married to men who earned such incomes. Full extension was passed in 1913 by a *Venstre* government with support of Labour.

(2) **Electoral data.** The vote shares for the 1912 election lump together Liberals (*Venstre*) and Labour Democrats, who jointly obtained 40 percent, while Labour received 26.3 percent. In 1915 the vote shares are given separately for Liberals, who received 33.1 percent, Labour Democrats with 4.2 percent, and Labour with 32.1 percent. *Venstre* had an outright majority of seats in both cases and won more seats in 1915 (74/123) than in 1912 (70/123) indicating that its share of votes increased. Turnout is given by Nohlen and Stöver (2010: 1438) as 65.9 percent in 1912 and 57.6 in 1915 but calculating from the raw numbers they provide gives 66.3 percent for 1912 and 59.4 for 1915. *Venstre* was a center-Left party, with Labour on its left. Hence, to identify μ_x we lump *Venstre*, Labour Democrats, and Labour shares.

(3) **Mean.** In the 1901 municipal elections the turnout for whole country was 45 percent for males and 20.9 percent for females. Over 60 percent of females over age of 25 became eligible under the 1907 partial extension. The number of qualified women was large in the towns compared to the country. In the 1906 election, the last election with only male suffrage, turnout was 60.9 percent. Male turnout in 1909 election, the first after the partial extension to women at the national level, increased to 67.5 and in the 1912 election, the last before universal suffrage, to 68.8. It fell slightly, to 68.4 in the 1915 election, when in addition to incorporating women, age requirement was lowered from 25 to 23. Women's turnout in 1915 was 50.5 percent (Tingsten 1937: 14).

Denmark 1915

(1) **Reform.** Women could vote and stand in local elections as of 1908 if they met tax requirements. Married women whose husbands had the right to vote also could vote. Suffrage was extended to women on the same conditions as men at the national level by the constitutional reform of 1915. The reform also lowered the voting age from 30 to 25 in elections to the *folketing*. The government was of the Radical Liberal Party (*Det Radikale Venstre*).

(2) **Electoral data.** Vote shares in 1913 were 29.6 for Social Democrats and 28.6 for *Venstre*, which won the plurality of seats. Turnout was 74.5 percent. The 1915 election took a place without any campaigning due to the War and was settled without voting in 104 of 114 constituencies. Women voted for the first time in 1918. Social Democrats received 28.7 percent, *Venstre* 29.4 percent. Turnout was 75.5 percent.

(3) **Mean.** In the 1909 municipal election, 456,281 men and 422,999 women were qualified to vote. Turnout rates for men and women were respectively 76.5 and 50, while in 1913 they were 77.9 and 55.7. The difference came mostly from rural districts, where men's turnout was 72.9 and 73.2 in the two elections while women's turnout was 38.3 percent and 43.9 percent. In 1889, Women's Suffrage Association (*Kvindevalgretsforeningen*) collected 20,000 signatures in support for the extension of suffrage at the local level in Jutland (<http://www.kvinfo.dk/side/680/article/2/>).

(4) **Correlation.** Observing that total turnout increased from 74.5 percent to 75 percent, the outcome seems to be inconsistent with the prediction of the

model: $\rho < 0$ and decrease in turnout. The increase of the turnout, however, is due solely to the increase in the turnout of males. Their turnout in the 1918 election was 84 percent, significantly higher than that of 1913 elections. Women's turnout was 67.6 percent which is much lower than the participation by men. Differences were 12.5 percent in Copenhagen, 18.9 percent in Islands and 16.4 in Jutland implying that fewer women voted in more rural areas. Although left-wing women did have unions organizations, such as Union of Women Workers established in 1886 to organize unskilled women workers, these organizations did not demand suffrage in particular but mostly better working conditions and equal working rights.

(5) **Caveats.** Male turnout increased from to 74.5 in 1913 to 84 in 1918.

Canada 1918

(1) **Reform.** Partial extensions varied among provinces. In 1884, Ontario was the first province to grant municipal franchise to widows and spinsters. In the 1890's, municipal franchise was extended to widows and spinsters in New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and the North West Territories, Nova Scotia (also to married woman owning property), British Columbia and Manitoba (to all women rate-payers). Bills for provincial enfranchisement of women were introduced but defeated in Ontario, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, and Quebec. In 1916, Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan passed full female suffrage, without much opposition. Quebec, however, did not grant suffrage to women until 1940. Female relatives of military serving overseas and women serving as nurses were granted the right to vote in national elections in 1917 election and universal female suffrage was passed in 1918, by a Conservative government. The electorate increased from 1,820 thousand in 1911 to 2,093 thousand in 1917, so that the impact of the partial extension was minimal. In turn, the electorate more than doubled as a result of the full extension, under which women voted for the first time in 1921.

(2) **Electoral data.** In 1917 Conservatives received 56.9 percent and Liberals 38.3, and in 1921 Conservatives 30.0, Liberals 41.2, and newly formed Progressives 21.1 percent. Parameters are identified by using two-party shares, which for Conservatives are 59.8 in 1917, and 42.1 in 1921. Turnout was 75.0 in 1917 and 67.7 in 1921 (*Elections Canada*, which corrects for plural votes).

(4) **Correlation.** The National Council of Women of Canada founded in 1893, was a chapter of the International Council of Woman. The Council was chaired by Lady Aberdeen, wife of then-Governor General Hamilton-Gordon. Although the Council was pro-suffrage, the support was motivated by the concerns for racial degeneration, arguing that extending political right to white women would protect the nation from racial domination by non-white immigrants. Overall there seem to have been few suffrage related activities by working class women and the most of the suffrage support came from upper-class Right-wing women.

Germany 1918

(1) **Reform.** The extension was passed in November 1918 as a decree of the Council of People's Deputies, composed of SPD and Independent Social Democratic Party (UPSD), which split from the SPD in 1917. It was integrated into the 1919 Weimar Constitution. In addition to the extension, plural voting was abolished and voting age was reduced from 25 to 20. The number of registered voters increased from 13.4 million to 37.5 million.

(2) **Electoral data.** In 1912 SPD won 34.8 percent of votes with turnout of 84.9, while in 1919 it won 37.9 percent with turnout of 83.0. UPSD won 7.6 percent in 1919, so that the total share of the extenders was 45.5.

(4) **Correlation.** $\rho = -0.23$ indicates that the support for suffrage was concentrated among supporters of the Right-wing. This is surprising given that the SPD was always committed to universal suffrage. Yet SPD leaders were also concerned about the electoral effects of women enfranchisement. According to Evans (1980: 544), "At this rather theoretical level, indeed, votes for women was not a controversial issue with the SPD. Differences began ... when discussion descended to the level of practical politics. And here, the main issue around which debate on the vote for women turned was not its justice or utility as far as women were concerned, but rather its likely impact on the political system as a whole. This in fact was the aspect of women's suffrage which most concerned the men in the party" SPD leaders feared that, given that women were more influenced by religion than men, suffrage would lead to the dominance of the Zentrum party. Even August Bebel, the leading advocate of women's suffrage, conceded in his 1895 *Reichstag* speech that "it was probable that women were more influenced by religion than were men." (Evans, 1980: 546). These fears were confirmed by the post-extension elections. According to Tingsten (1975: 41), women voters clearly supported right-wing parties in the 1920 election. Although women seem to have voted against the extenders, women's voting frequency was about 10 percent less than that of men's on average. Furthermore, this discrepancy was larger in more conservative Catholic districts. (Tingsten 1937: 29).

(5) **Caveat.** The electorate almost tripled.

Netherlands 1919

(1) **Reform.** In 1918 election, male universal suffrage and a change in electoral rule from first past the post to proportional system were implemented. Right-wing coalition was the incumbent after 1918 election: General League of Roman Catholic Caucuses (30.0 percent), Anti Revolutionary Party (13.4 percent), and Christian Historical Union (6.5 percent). Between three major right wing parties, they had 50 out of 100 seats with total of 49.9 percent popular votes. Additionally, Christian Democratic Party (0.8 percent) and Christian Social Party (0.6 percent) each with 1 seat each gave the coalition 51.3 percent of popular vote and 52 out of 100 seats. The bill to extend was initiated by Henri Merchant, the leader of VDB (Free-thinking Democratic League), not

by the government. A fraction of the governing coalition, particularly of the Calvinist Anti-revolutionary Party was strongly opposed to the bill. Hence, the passage was supported by the opposition and the more centrist faction of the government.

(2) **Electoral data.** In 1918, Right-wing religious parties received together 51.3 percent, with turnout of 88.6. In 1922, they obtained 54.5 percent with turnout of 88.8. Voting was made compulsory as of 1918. Those who did not vote were punished through progressive fine, which may explain high turnout and little effect of suffrage extension.

(4) **Correlation.** There is strong evidence of opposition to extension by Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary party which condemned female suffrage on religious grounds. Women refused to vote even given penalty (There are no statistics on the frequency of refusals). Commune mayors have been recommended by the government to accept "conscientious objections as valid excuse [not to vote]. According to the electoral results of 1925 election, correlation between women's vote share and vote share of conservative parties was highly positive ($\rho = 0.54$) in districts in Amsterdam (Tingsten 1937: 75-76).

(5) **Caveats.** The identity of the extending party is difficult to determine.

Sweden 1919

(1) **Reform.** Women could vote in local elections as early as of 1863. The extension was passed by a Liberal-Social Democrats coalition in 1919

(2) **Electoral data.** The complication is that in 1920 there was an election in which women still could not vote. The joint shares of the coalitions partners were 58.7 in 1917, 51.4 in 1920, and 54.9 in 1921. Turnout was 65.8 in 1917, 55.3 in 1920, and 54.2 in 1921.

(3) **Mean.** Male turnout in 1921 was 62.0 and female 47.2. Although women could not vote at national level in 1920 because of registration issues, they have voted at the local level. Turnout in the 1919 Lansting (county councils) was 68.9 for males and 61.8 for females. Data by sex are also available for the prohibition referendum of 1922, with male turnout of 62.6 and female of 48.3.

(4) **Correlation.** The women's suffrage organization, LKPR, was formally politically neutral: chaired by a Conservative, a Social Democrat, and a Liberal. The main opposition of women's suffrage came from the Conservatives, while Liberals and the Social Democrats were in favour of women's suffrage as soon as full male suffrage had been introduced in 1909. Moreover, Conservatives opposed the 1918 Reform Bill. The results of the prohibition referendum show 59.1 percent of males to have been opposed and 58.5 percent of women to have been in favor, thus indicating that at least in this regard women were more conservative than men.

(5) **Caveats.** The result of the 1920 election may indicate that men reacted against the extension. But these were tumultuous years in Sweden and many other factors may have come into play. Moreover, the 1919 extension also changed male criteria from economic independence to universal (age above 23) and the number of eligible voters was almost thrice larger in 1921 than in 1920.

United States 1920

(1) **Reform.** Suffrage to women was already extended at the state level in several states, beginning with Wyoming in 1869. Several Southern states were opposed to women's suffrage and stalled the ratification of amendment. Alabama ratified the amendment in 1901, Florida and South Carolina in 1901, Georgia and Louisiana in 1901 and Mississippi in 1901. While the extension was passed under a Democratic administration, the evidence suggests that the Republicans were more keen on passing the extension. The key vote came on June 4, 1919, when the Senate approved the amendment by 56 to 25 after four hours of debate, during which Democratic Senators opposed to the amendment filibustered to prevent a roll call until their absent Senators could be protected by pairs. The Ayes included 36 (82 percent) Republicans and 20 (54 percent) Democrats. The Nays comprised 8 (18 percent) Republicans and 17 (46 percent) Democrats. The Nineteenth Amendment, which prohibited state or federal sex-based restrictions on voting, was ratified by a sufficient number of states in 1920.

(2) **Electoral data.** Woodrow Wilson received 49.2 percent of the popular vote while Charles Evans Hughes received 46.1 percent in the 1916 election, with turnout of 61.6 percent. In 1920, James M. Cox (Democratic Party) received 34.2 percent and Warren G. Harding (Republican) won 60.3 percent, with turnout falling to 49.2 percent.

(3) **Mean.** There are no participation data by gender. However, using data from 21 Northern states, Rice and Willey (1928) calculate that women's turnout rate in 1920 could have been as low as 35 percent. The partial data from Chicago show that turnout of men was 75 percent and of women 46 percent (Tingsten 1975: 32). On gender differentials in turnout and their determinants, see Kleppner (1982) and Corder and Wolbrecht (2006).

(4) **Correlation.** Women leaders were predominantly upper class on both sides of the issue. There is very little evidence that left-wing or working-class women organized to promote suffrage extension.

(5) **Caveats.** The identity of the extending party is difficult to determine.

United Kingdom 1928

(1) **Reform.** Through Representation of the People Act 1918, women over 30 who satisfied property requirements were enfranchised. This extension enfranchised around seven million women while leaving five million still disenfranchised because of the age restriction. Suffrage was extended to women on the same basis as men through the Representation of the People Act 1928. Conservatives were in office.

(2) **Electoral data.** In the last election before full extension, in 1924, Conservatives won 46.8 percent of the vote with turnout of 77.0. In the election following the extension, in 1929, Conservatives received 38.1 percent with turnout of 76.3 percent.

(3) **Mean.** British election statistics do not distinguish between genders at

any occasion. However according to the Gosnell (1930), the voting frequency among the women was about 10 percent lower than among men in typical electoral districts in 1924.

(4) **Correlation.** Conservative suffragists found the vote for women acceptable only if it were limited to property-owners. Many Liberals feared this solution - indeed thought it political suicide - because they believed the class so enfranchised would vote Conservative.

The earliest women's movements were organized mostly by the women from the high class and were anti-suffrage. In 1865, the proposal to form a society for suffrage in the Ladies Discussion Society was turned down because of the fear that such an organization would be taken over by extremists. The Primrose League was set up to promote conservative values among women of all classes. An article appealing against women's suffrage was published in June 1889, signed by 104 women and 2000 supplementary signatories, including women who were well connected in politics through their husbands or aristocratic status (Auchterlonie 2007: 44). Anti-suffragists from the elite included Lady Jersey, who became a leading member of the Women's National Anti-Suffrage League, founded in 1908. There was, however, also some pro-suffrage activism by right-wing women, whose main focus was to limit suffrage to the upper class women so that the extension would benefit the Conservative Party and the pro-suffrage activities would not interfere with the principles of Primrose League. Once suffrage was extended, they organized activities to bring voters to the poll.

Left-wing pro-suffrage groups were small and ineffective throughout the late 1800's. In 1897, National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) allied itself closely with the Labour Party. The Women's Liberal Association (WLA), formed in 1888, became more effective as the association organized under the Women's Liberal Federation (WFL). In 1903, Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) was formed by splitting from non-militant NUWSS and began militant campaigns. Suffrage groups expanded quickly through other organizations such as Women's Freedom League, the East London Federation of Suffragettes, and the United Suffragists. These groups effectively lobbied the MPs who did not support the suffrage extension to women. WSPU's membership was restricted only to women and worked loosely with Independent Labour Party, which supported universal adult suffrage. The organization was noted for aggressive demonstrations, lobbying parliament, militant activities involving breaking windows of government buildings, and a large number of arrests due to these activities. By the break out of the WWI, this organization was perceived as the obstacle by most of the other non-militant women's group.

Argentina 1947

(1) **Reforms.** Vote was extended to women in 1927 in the province of San Juan, but was derogated after the coup of 1930. In 1946 Evita Peron became Women's Secretary of *Partido Laborista* and pushed for women suffrage, which first passed in 1947 as a decree-law, unanimously approved by the Senate, and

was ratified in the 1949 constitutional reform.

(2) **Electoral data.** Peron (Labor Party) won 53.1 percent in 1946, with turnout of 83.4 percent. In 1951 Peron won 62.5 percent, with turnout of 88.0 percent.

(3) **Mean.** According to Little (1973: 271), 2768 thousand males voted in 1946 and 3715 thousand in 1951, while the number of women voters in 1951 was 3757 thousand. The Peronista share among males was 53.7 percent in 1946, increasing to 62.0 percent in 1951, while his share among women was 65.0 percent.

(4) **Correlation.** Women's suffrage movement had a long history of association with the Left, dating from 1902 when *Centro Socialista Femenista* was formed. In a 1920 simulation of municipal elections with women, Socialist Party received 2000 out of 3878 votes. In 1928 Mario Bravo's (PS) proposal for women vote passed in the House but was defeated in the Senate. The same occurred in 1932. In 1933 UCR (Radical Party) created Women's Association. The impetus for suffrage came from the Left and was resisted by the Right.

(5) **Caveats.** Peron's share among men increased between 1946 and 1951, as did the male electorate.

Chile 1949

(1) **Reforms.** Women could vote on the same basis as men in municipal elections as of 1931.

(2) **Electoral data.** In 1946, the Radical Party candidate, Gonzalez Videla, won the plurality of 40.2 percent but in 1952 the plurality was won by an independent candidate, Ibañez del Campo, with a share of 46.8 percent and the Radical candidate obtained 20.0 percent. In both cases, the president was elected in the second round by the Congress. The partisan placement of Ibañez del Campo is difficult to determine. If he is classified as Left, the share of the Left (Radical+Socialist) in 1946 was 42.7 percent and in 1952 (Ibañez +Radical+Socialist) was 72.3 percent. Turnout was 75.9 percent in 1946 and 86.6 in 1952. The vote for extension was unanimous. Given this information, we do not estimate the parameters.

(3) **Mean.** According to Maza Valenzuela (1995: 30) the rates of registration and the turnouts in the municipal elections between 1932 and 1952 were much lower for women than men.

(4) **Correlation.** Women voted disproportionately for the Right parties in municipal elections.

Bolivia 1952

(1) **Reforms.** The legislature was dissolved on 7 June 1951. Revolution (from above) occurred in 1952. National Revolutionary Movement instituted universal male and female suffrage.

(2) **Electoral data.** In 1951, the MNR candidate, Paz Estenssoro won 42.9 percent of popular vote with turnout of 61.7 percent. A revolution from

above intervened before the next election in 1956, won by Siles Zuazo, also MNR, with 81.4 percent share and turnout of 85.0. The extension, however, was from literate males to universal male and female and the number of voters increases almost seven-fold. Hence the *ceteris paribus* assumption about males is implausible. We do not estimate the parameters.

Greece 1952

(1) **Reform.** In 1924, the National Assembly granted literate women over 30 (with a delay of five years) the right to vote in local elections. This extension became effective for 1934 local elections but only 240 women voted, due to negligence in registering women. In 1945, a resolution of the National Assembly of the Popular Revolutionary Authority of Greece (PEEA) recognized the equal civil and political rights for both sexes in a temporary constitutional document. The formalization of constitution was delayed, however, due to the civil war in 1945-1949. Suffrage was fully extended to women in 1952 through Act 2159 by a minority centrist coalition of the Liberal party and National Progressive Center Union under the leadership of Nikolasos Plastiras. The bill was passed with 72 MPs voting for it, 64 against, and 3 abstaining. Women were, however, excluded from voting in 1952 due to the delay in the registration process.

(2) **Electoral data.** The last election prior to the extension was in 1951. The turnout out of registered voter was 77.2 percent. Although the Greek Rally won the plurality of votes, replacing the traditionally dominant right-wing People's Party, a minority centrist government, which won 42.5 percent, was formed. Plastiras resigned in 1952 which led to the 1952 election in November. In 1952, the Centrist Coalition won 34.2 percent, with turnout of 75.4 percent. In 1956, the extending coalition obtained 48.2 percent of votes with turnout of 75.0 percent. Note that the compulsory voting was in effect.

(4) **Correlation.** The most notable women's organization in Greece related to suffrage was League of Women's Rights. Many women's organization existed before 1920s, however most of them were devoted to social work which were education and cultural. The League was exclusively focused on equal rights for women; economic, civil and political rights. The parental organization was the International Women's Suffrage Alliance (IWSA). The league's activities were suppressed by military government of Ioannis Metaxas in 1930's.¹⁰ Although there is very little information on the social backgrounds of the members and the leaders, given that illiteracy was very high among women around the time and there are some evidence of disagreements between the League and the other organizations, such as socialists and worker's unions, the League seems to have been headed by educated upper class women.

(5) **Caveats.** In the 1952 election the vote share of the Right (Rally and People's Party) increased to 50.3 percent from 43.2 percent in 1951, while the share of center-Left (NPCU plus Liberal plus United Democratic Left) declined

¹⁰ *The Role of Women in Greece* www.greecegreek.com/Miscellaneous/role-women-greece.html

from 42.5 to 34.2 percent. It may well be that male voters punished the centrist extenders.

Mexico 1953

(1) **Reform.** Women could vote in municipal elections as of 1947. The extension at the national level was adopted as an amendment to article 34 of the Constitution of 1917.

(2) **Electoral data.** In 1952, the last election before the extension, PRI won 74.3 percent with turnout of 75.2 percent. In 1958 PRI won 90.4 percent with turnout of 71.8 percent.