Continuity and change of urban policies in São Paulo: resilience, latency, and reanimation[1]

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Abstract

Large metropolises of the South are usually treated as incapable of producing redistributive policy change. It is also considered that policy change may happen gradually or punctuated, but always in relatively linear and continuous ways.

Analyzing urban policies in São Paulo from the mid-80s and 2016, this article shows otherwise. It suggests that relevant policy change may occur in those cities, including not only programs that entered the agenda to stay, but also policies that swung between implementation, interruption, latency, and later reanimation. The analysis brings to the forefront elements not yet accounted for by the literature such as policy resilience, latency and reanimation. I depart from previously detailed analyses of eight urban policy sectors (Marques, 2020) that showed an incremental trajectory of redistributive policy change in the city due jointly to political competition (and the role of progressive governments) and policy processes involving multilevel politics, policy institutionalization and the embeddedness of civil society actors in policy sectors.

To describe and analyze the details of resilience and of transitions back and forth from latency and reanimation are the goals of this article. To do so, I compare four housing and transportation programs, two with each type of trajectory – a. in situ slum upgrading and b. bus integration in transportation (that gradually imposed themselves), and c. cooperative self-help housing construction and d. bus lanes/corridors (that oscillated between latency and reanimation).

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This article analyzes the trajectories of urban policy change in São Paulo, Brazil. It is usually considered that policy change involves processes that may be gradual or punctuated but tend to be relatively linear and continuous. In most models developed to explain policy change, policies may be altered by external shocks, or by endogenous processes triggered by changes in political coalitions and the ideas associated to them, by the erosion of policy monopolies or by windows of opportunity aligning problems, policies, and problems under the active coordination of entrepreneurs. The change would be mainly concentrated in decision making and even more strongly in agenda setting. In all these cases, however, when the time of certain policies came, they would impose themselves in more or less permanent manners.

This article brings evidence of additional processes not yet accounted for by the literature, involving the existence of swinging policy trajectories that are created and implemented, but after a while failed to enter the agenda definitively. Instead of disappearing, however, these policies go to latency to be reanimated by the next government that aligns with its principles and goals. Depending on local policy processes and actors, these policies may create stronger resilience with time, becoming more institutionalize, or face increasing difficulties to be reanimated.

These trajectories are shown by comparing urban redistributive policies developed by the municipal government of the city of São Paulo, Brazil, since the return of the country to democracy in mid-1980s until 2016. The study departs from previous detailed monographic analysis using process tracing of eleven policy sectors in the city (Marques, 2020), as well as a configurational analysis of the main determinants of those policies' trajectories (Marques, 2020b). Those studies showed that many policies in the city experienced a slow and incremental process of policy change in the direction of more redistributive and inclusive programs and actions, although with different paces in distinct policy sectors.

This trajectory was explained by a combination of political and policy mechanisms and processes (Marques, 2020). During the period, São Paulo experienced very intense political competition with governments of right wing (RW), centre-right wing (CRW) and left-wing (LW) political ideologies alternating in power.[3] Regardless of this, and the relatively conservative tone of the local electorate with mayoral results skewed to the right (Limongi and Mesquita, 2011) and the local Council controlled mostly by right-wing majorities (Marques and Hoyler, 2020), the city produced a relatively rich set of redistributive policies, although produced incrementally and with sectoral variation. It is not the task of this article to present details of each of these trajectories, nor to test quantivatively the causes of these redistributive programs, bot tasks developed elsewhere (Marques, 2020a, 2020b). This article focuses qualitatively on the two types of trajectories present in São Paulo in the period –the ones that implosed themselves and of the ones that oscilated, discussing in detail the main elements involved in those trajectories – resilience, latency and reanimation of redistributive programs.

I consider as redistributive urban policies the ones that impact positively the lives of the poor by providing infrastructure and services, reducing precarity and their cost of living, warrantying good urban location or more generally significantly improving their welfare. In some cases, this is done through distributive processes in Lowi (1963)'s sense, involving apparently positive sum games with other policies (such as establishing free fares for the elderly or building new subways lines). In other policies, this implies clear reductions of welfare for elites, upper middle-classes and private companies, as well as higher costs or less benefits for these groups (such as in building bus dedicated lanes or in establishing redistributive taxes). Following Holland and Schneider (2017), I define the former type of redistribution as easy and the latter as hard, theorizing that easy redistribution policies probably may impose themselves in

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[3] The distinction of ideological blocks is based on the relevant literature for the Brazilian case that has been showing that blocks of political parties in Brazil present clear ideological distinctions if parliamentary behavior is investigated systematically (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999) and when attitudes towards policies are considered (Samuels and Zucco, 2018), contrary to more general previous interpretations (Ames, 2000). However, it is important to acknowledge that these positions were not stable in the period of this study and while what I call left (PT and allies) was certainly located more to the left in the 1980s, what I classify as centre-right (PMDB, PSDB and PSD) occupied a more centre position (and maybe even centre-left when Mario Covas was the mayor of São Paulo). In any case, it seems also clear that the relative positions of these political forces stayed more or less unchanged during the period, what leads tme to maintain the argument.

agendas and be institutionalized more frequently, while hard redistribution programs will probably be more frequent candidates to oscillating trajectories with latency and reanimation.

To describe and analyze the details of both the continuously progressive and the oscilating trajectories, including both resilience and transition back and forth from latency and reanimation, I compare two policies that experienced each kind of trajectory. Considering the importance of sectoral variation, a policy from each kind of trajectory was chosen from housing and from transportation policies, two of the most important policy sectors that produce and maintain the functioning of the city. As we will see, not only political competition, but also multilevel politics, policy institutionalization (involving the creation of agencies, bureaucracies and policy instruments) and the presence of civil society actors embedded in the policy sectors are key elements for policy resilience, latency and reanimation.

The article is organized around four sections, additionally to this introduction and the conclusion. In the next section I discuss theoretical arguments of the literature on policy production and policy change that dialogue with the study. To better situate the reader, the following session summarizes particularities of municipal governments in Brazil and of the São Paulo political scenario, and the third presents the general trajectory of redistributive programs. The fourth section discusses in detail the trajectories of two programs in the housing sector and other two in the transportation section. Each pair includes one program that come to stay and imposed itself as a policy solution through time, even if with different intensities – (a) slum upgrading in housing and (c) bus integration in transportation –, and one program that oscillated between reanimation and latency – (b) cooperative self-help housing construction and (d) bus lanes/corridors in the same sectors, respectively.

1.   What the literature says about and policy production and change?

The theme of policy change has been framed by the literature through several theoretical models. Although they are widely known, it is important to recuperate their main elements to make clear to the reader the contribution of the processes discussed in the following session. The theme is centrally presence at least in the three of the most important recent models of policy process, as well as in more localized

contributions about the role of ideas. The theme is obviously connected to debates about gradual or punctuated institutional change in neoinstitutionalism (Mahoney and Thelen, 2020; Pierson, 2004), but that literature has a more ambitious focus on societal and institutional change in general, differently from the more localized focus on policy change developed here.

Obviously, this discussion assumes a certain definition of policy change. In Hall (1993)'s classical definition, change may vary from routine adjustments to new instruments and major shifts in policy goals. The cases discussed in the following sessions involve new policy solutions (for example in situ slum upgrading or social housing backed by land new zoning), considerable reorganization of existing solutions (priority to buses in traffic control) and policies created for new goals (such as bicycle lane). Many of those involved new instruments, but these are not considered just minor automatic operational tools, but socially constructed policy instruments that incorporate world views, restrict or include social groups and alter policy impacts differently for distinct social groups (Lascoumes and Le Galés, 2005).

Since at least incrementalism (Lindlom, 1979), the policy literature has been trying to understand how policies change, although in that case the centre of the analysis rested on the nature of decision making. The scrutiny of policy change would come to the forefront mainly with the discussion of agenda setting. Departing from garbage can models (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972), Kingdon (1984) stated that policy trajectories would be characterized by the intermingled but independent streams of politics, solutions and problems. The first would involve the actors, conflicts and dynamics associated with policy trajectories within political institutions. The second would involve policy ideas, technical solutions and operational capacities available for the government, while the third would refer to socially recognized problems. The emphasis of the latter on social recognition specified that the model did not refer to social problems as understood by the people who live them, but to the ways these were framed and recognized by society. These three streams were independent, although interconnected, and their alignment would lead to the opening of windows of opportunity. This would usually happen by the actions of political entrepreneurs, who produced negotiations, debated and advertised policy ideas and solutions and worked to change the social framing of problems in certain directions.

Sabatier and Jenkings-Smith (1993), differently, constructed a broad model for policy analysis that mobilized mainly elements from the pluralist tradition. Major changes in policies would be associated with the actions of advocacy coalitions at different government levels, amalgamated by common interests, but also by similar policy ideas defended by them. In this process changes of ideas about policies would be central, considering their different centrality in policies – core beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary aspects. Changes would be easier in secondary aspects, less in policy cores and much harder in core beliefs (usually normative). Different beliefs would be sustained and advocated by different coalitions and influenced by the learning processes that came back from policy implementation. Changes would occur both incrementally and in concentrated moments, but large changes would happen in time horizons as long as 10 years. In the routine change of policies, coalitions would learn from implementation (filtered by their beliefs) and usually adjust secondary aspects. But non-routine changes would be triggered by internal and external shocks associated with crisis of confidence strong enough to shake or dislocate the belief systems of the coalitions competing for the agenda. External shocks and events were not understood as sufficient triggers but would have to be associated with their internal political mobilization by coalitions internally to subsystems. Expert communities and the media would have a role in these processes.

In a third broad contribution to the analysis of the policy process, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) sustained that policy processes would be marked by long periods of stability punctuated by concentrated moments of change. These would depend on external shocks associated with large changes in government and society such as shifts in party control over government or in public opinion, as well as depend on the production of disproportionate attention to certain themes or the weakening of existing policy images and monopolies. Usually the crisis of policy monopolies would be preceded by long trajectories of contestation, a process that would frequently lead to the mobilization of new actors, contributing to a broader destabilization of the subsystem. The punctuated nature of change would be due to the long-term resistance to change of these subsystems, until previous policies could not be defended.

Finally, several different and more localized contributions have associated policy change with the circulation of ideas, transference and learning in policies, although mobilizing quite different definitions and mechanisms for these processes (Campbell, 2002). Ideas in this sense may range from broad concepts to quite concrete policy solutions, sometimes understood in connection with institutions (Belánd, 2019). While some authors conceptualize the phenomenon as transference of whole policy solutions - as if ready-to-use ideas could be move from one situation to another (Campbell, 1997), others have defended the concept of idea circulation - in which the destiny would have a substantial amount of agency (Shipan and Volden, 2012), while still others discuss the patterns of diffusion, with or without a geography dimension. In the broader cases, the production and circulation of ideas would lead to the production of wide sets of policy solutions articulated in policy paradigms (Hall, 1992). In what concerns this article's preoccupation, however, policies may change because of the emulation, copy or learning processes caused by the circulation of ideas and solutions influenced by entrepreneurs, organizations or epistemic communities (Haas, 1992). While the understanding of the process as transference implies abrupt change (associated with the arrival of the solution), the concept of circulation predicts either gradual or punctuated change.

In all these models, therefore, policy change is produced through a combination of incremental long-term changes with punctuated transformations, usually when a new policy managed to be installed using a window of opportunity, when a coalition won and in able to introduce its beliefs or when a policy became a new monopoly. Indeed, the policies analyzed in the following sections suggest that many of the elements discussed by the literature are present as the importance of party changes, occasional political entrepreneurs, the role of ideas and of groups who advocate them. However, the São Paulo cases also show trajectories distinct from than the ones suggested by the literature. They include many incremental and cumulative changes through time, but also oscillating patterns of changes between latency and reanimation. Although only some of these changes can be classified as paradigmatic shifts, almost all of them meant significant transformations in the services delivered to the population and especially for the poor, with intense redistributive consequences.

2. Municipal governments in Brazil and the politics of São Paulo

This session intends to give some political and institutional context about Brazil and São Paulo, especially for the reader less familiarized with the case. It is important to start by stating that municipalities are a third constitutionally recognized level of government in Brazil. They are entitled by law to deliver many policies, especially urban policies such as bus transportation, traffic control, garbage collection, land use and development regulation, road infrastructure, urban parks and green areas and construction and commerce control. Sanitation is a municipal policy but by historical reasons it is delivered in most of the country by state level companies. Housing is concurrent between government levels, and both policing and environment regulation are state level policies, although municipalities also create local agencies that play secondary roles. Municipalities directly tax and control land property and economic services and commerce. They also count on federal earmarked transferences proportional to their population and from sectorial policies such as health and education, as well as politically defined discretionary transferences.

Brazil returned to democracy in mid-80s after a gradual (and slow) transition, that was concluded with the new Constitution of 1988.[4] This study covers the period from 1982 to 2016, including nine mayor terms. The first two terms present particularities, since the first – Mario Covas – was appointed by the governor for a term of less than 3 years in office, while the second – Janio Quadros – was already directly elected in in 1985 but served for a shorter term of 3 years. Since 1988, all mayors were directly elected for four years terms as did municipal councilors. In this period, São Paulo had three right-wing mayors – Quadros, Maluf and Pitta –, three centre-right mayors – Covas, Serra and Kassab –, and three left-wing mayors – Erundina, Suplicy and Haddad (two of the latter, women). This result states a quite stable pattern of electoral behavior (Limongi and Mesquita, 2011) with the local electorate slightly skewed to the right. This is even more pronounced in the local Council elections, where the right and the centre-right were always majoritarian (Marques and Hoyler, 2020). In any case, due to Brazilian electoral rules and party

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[4] The mandatory biparty system was abolished in 1980 and direct elections for governors came in 1982, while for mayors of state capitals and other important cities just in 1988 and for president in 1989. The first civilian president was elected (indirectly) in 1985 and the new democratic Constitutions was promulgated in 1988. This last event is considered to mark the complete the transition.

system, no mayor managed to elect a Council majority, although all of them have the largest plurality. To govern, all of them except one constructed governing coalitions with other parties after the election, although with quite different strategies (Marques and Hoyler, 2020). During the period, the centre-right won all eight elections for state governor. The municipality of São Paulo, however, presented a quite clear political alternance between ideological groups in the control of the executive.

3.The general trajectory of policies

In this session I summarize the main elements present in the trajectory of the redistributive programs developed in São Paulo in the period. The detailed analysis of these trajectories and their main determinants are developed elsewhere (Marques, 2020 and 2020b), but presenting a broad picture of what happened seems essential for the understanding of the four policy trajectories discussed in detail in the following session.

The comparison of a broad range of policies shows a slow and conflictive, but clearly incremental process of policy progressivism, with the increase and the diversification of urban redistribution policies over time. In this, redistributive innovations were introduced mainly in left-wing governments, compatibly with partisan politics arguments. On the other hand, in policy existence (the continuity of previously existing iniciatives), the differences between left and right were reduced, compatibly with median voter mechanisms. Therefore, although policy creation depends on ideology and mainly the left starts them, most politicians avoid dismantling policies, considering that the city's electorate is mostly poor. As we will see, policy continuity was also helped by the presence of elements that enhance policy resilience, such as multi level politics (regulations and funds form other levels of government, as well as international) and policy institucionalization (the creation of agencies, bureaucracies and instruments).

However, some policies were stopped, mainly in right-wing administrations, especially the ones that hurt important interests or produce explicit zero-sum redistribution games, what we can all hard redistribution. Instead of disappearing, most of these policies went to latency and were reanimated later. This latency mode allowed them to be resumed with much more speed and precision than if they have

been terminated and started again from scratch. As we will see in the next section, this was enabled by multi-level politics and by the presence of civil society actors embedded in policy sectors.

Before discussing details of specific policy trajectories, it is useful to present the general features of the policy trajectories. Table 1 below summarizes the information of all the redistributive programs of the period in São Paulo, considering three different implementation intensities (Marques, 2020) already highlighting the four policies analyzed in the next section of this paper (a to d).

Table 1. Summary of policy trajectories, redistributive programs, São Paulo

Policies and programs	Administrations (Mayors and Governors, classified by ideological block (Left; Centre-Right; Right))									Easy or Hard
	Covas (CR)	Janio (R)	Erundina (L)	Maluf (R)	Pitta (R)	Suplicy (L)	Serra (CR)	Kassab (CR)	Haddad (L)	
Housing — a slum upgrading										E
b cooperative self-help projects										H
settlement regularization										E
central city housing										H
social rent										H
construction of new units for sale										E
better located projects										H
Buses — c improve lines										H
control over lines										H
creation of a smart card										E
d new dedicated lanes/corridors										H
creation of free passes										E
fare subsidies										H
single fare (not by distance)										E
Traffic control — prioritize bus circulation										H
bike lanes and bikeways										E
Waste management — reduce service inequalities										E
control over trucks and services										H
expand to slums										E
recycling with pickers										H
creation of a collection tax										H
Development regulation — better regulation/less corruption										E
Urban renewal OI/UO — include social housing										H
heterogeneous perimeters										E
extract larger surpluses										H
more participation										H
Road infrastructure — street construction in peripheries										E

	Montoro (CR)	Quercia (CR)	Fleury (CR)	Covas (CR)	Covas (CR)	Alkmin (CR)	Serra (CR)	Alckmin (CR)		Easy or Hard
Subway (State level policy) — single fare (not by distance)										E
build new lines to peripheries										H
smart card (integration)										E
creation of free passes										E

Intensity of implementation: ☐ Strong ☐ Medium ☐ Weak ☐ inexistent

As we can see, the analysis involved programs of housing, bus services, traffic control, waste management, development regulation, urban renewal and road infrastructure (all municipal), as well as the subway (state level). A general analysis overview suggests both that policies differed substantially and that redistribuve

programs became more frequent as time went by. A few programs existed in almost all governments – single fares for buses and subway and construction of new housing units -, while others existed very rarely as the creation of a waste tax or better located housing projects.

Even at this general level, it is visible that left-wing administrations (Erundina, Suplicy and Haddad) created programs much more frequently than right-wing governments (Quadros, Maluf and Pitta), with centre-right governments (Covas, Serra and Kassab) in between the two. In fact, the left started 73% of programs, the centre-right 21% and the just right 6%. This is compatible with partisan politics assumptions and suggests both that political preferences towards redistribution vary according to party ideology, with left and right occupying opposite poles of a continuum, and that parties really seek to apply their agenda, once they are in power. If we also consider the existence of programs with any intensity, however, this difference still exists but is reduced, with the left responsible for 55% of the programs, while the right answers for 18% and the centre-right 27%. I interpreted this reduction of incidences as caused by median voter mechanism: in a city in which most of the electorate is poor or low-middle class, all politicians try to avoid stopping redistributive policies.

Even so, it was mainly the right who stopped previously ongoing projects - 75%, while the centre-right answered for 25% of the interruptions and left-wing governments did not discontinue one single program. Most of the stopped programs (70%) were politically costly hard redistribution initiatives. Finally, many of the programs that stopped, returned after one or two terms, most of them (96%) in the next left-wing government. All hard redistribution programs that returned from latency did so in left-wing administrations.

Therefore, it seems relatively clear that the mayors' party ideology matters, and that the production, maintenance and reanimation of redistributive programs is associated with moments in which the left was in power. But what happens to the policy trajectories that experience latency and reanimation? This is what we discuss in detail in the following section comparing the policy processes and actors present in the trajectories of two housing and two transportation programs.

4. Policy trajectories

Housing programs

As it is widely known, since their first expressions in the 1930s housing policies in Brazil were always insufficient to face the high demand produced by decades of intense migration accompanied by very low average salaries and unstable working conditions. The military governments massified housing policies between the 1960s and the early 1980, but also very far from facing the increasing demand, as well as with very low quality and n segregated urban locations. This led to the known prevalence of several forms of housing precarity in Brazilian cities. Additionally, however, housing policies were almost entirely based in the construction of new housing units in large projects in peripheries by private constructors for financed sale. The financial and organizational arrangements varied through time, but the presence of private contractors, the peripheral location of projects and the product itself – new units targeted for private ownership - were constants. The consequences of these choices are also widely known and reinforced the prevalence of precarity, mainly in vast segregated peripheral areas with very weak presence of the State. Precarity involved basically three distinct housing forms that differ in land tenure and usually also in urban conditions and location – favelas (occupied areas), irregular settlements (privately developed plots that were not regularized) and cortiços (tenements). In São Paulo, the main form of precarity until the 1980s were irregular settlements, but favelas became a problem of similar size since then (Bueno, 2000). In 2010, the municipality of São Paulo housed around 1.3 million people living in favelas and 1.7 million in irregular settlements, although with a substantial heterogeneity in each of these forms of precarity (Marques and Saraiva, 2017).

The decline of the military governments' policies in the 1980s led to a positive surge of municipal innovations in the subsequent decade (Marques, 2019). Among those new policies and programs, several were dedicated to precarity reduction such as slum upgrading and irregular settlements regularization, while others intended to develop new housing products such as cooperative self-help construction and social rent. Many of these new programs were also developed in São Paulo (some of them in pioneering versions). Two of them presented very different trajectories and are

discussed here in detail – in situ slum upgrading and cooperative self-help construction.

a. In situ slum upgrading – oscillating with increasing institutionalization and agenda presence

This type of program was slowly constructed in Brazilian municipal administrations through the 1990s in a process that may be described as collective policy learning within the policy community (Marques, 2019). This program involves the construction of infrastructure, the opening of street and allies, as well as some housing construction in the same location of the slum, with the minimum possible evictions. It departs from the idea that the right to good locations is among the most important elements of the right to housing and to the city (Bueno, 2000).

Strictly speaking, the municipality of São Paulo was not the pioneer in this kind of program, since they existed at least since the 60s in Rio de Janeiro, returning to that same city, among others, in the early 80s (Saraiva, 2019). However, São Paulo was one of the first large municipalities to develop large-scale programs of this kind in the early 90s, influencing several other experiences.

This trajectory started in fact in the early 80s during the Covas administration (CRW, 1983-1985, PMDB)[5] with small 'betterments' in several favelas, but did not involve encompassing upgrading projects, nor included all works necessary to give full infrastructure to the affected areas. In fact, at that time, the agency responsible for the works was subordinated to the Secretary of Social Assistance (and not Housing) and all the work was developed by social work professionals, instead of architects or engineers. The subsequent government of Jânio Quadros (RW, 1986-1988, PTB) restricted these activities even more.

It was in the Erundina administration (LW, 1989-1992, PT) that the first broad municipal program of in situ urbanization was created (Bueno, 1990). The policy was developed by the same agency, but now dislocated to the Housing Secretary, where it was gradually capacitated, integrated with other programs, and reformulated with a social housing emphasis. The constitution of the program involved the establishment

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[5] In all case, mayors are characterized by their party's ideological affiliation (LW, CRW and RW for left, centre-right and right wing), the period in office and the name of the party.

of new procedures and standards for project design, civil engineering and infrastructure works, developed by personal directly hired by the administration and contracted through contracted consulting firms. As in other policies of that administration, civil society actors from social movements, the academia and professional organizations were brought to the government, including from other cities and states (Bueno, 2000). Through this program, the government developed the upgrading of 22 favelas inhabited by 6,100 families, with other 74 favelas involving 22,500 families with works in place during the government transition (Marques and Pulhez, 2019; Amaral 2002, Bonduki 2000). Additionally, the municipality signed a contract with the Interamerican Development Bank – IDB - to develop a large-scale urban and environmental recuperation program around the Guarapiranga reservoir, a major water source for the city that is completely occupied, including with precarious settlements. This program, however, was signed in the last days of the government and would start just in the next administration (Uemura, 2000), but created resilience for the program.

The next government represented a strong ideological shift to the right with Paulo Maluf (RW, 1993-1996, PPB/PP). The previous program was terminated, and its staff was fired. Most of these technicians migrated to other municipal governments of the same party, but many went also back to academic positions and civil society organizations. The new administration created the Cingapura program, mobilizing resources from the Interamerican Development Bank – IDB, negotiated in part due to the existence of the program approved in the previous administration (Angélil, Siress and Sireis, 2013). Although announced as a slum upgrading program, this project included in fact the construction of new (vertical) housing units at the borders of some of the most visible favelas but leaving their largest part with no intervention. The program planned to construct 5,468 units in 23 favelas during this government (Amaral 2002, Marques and Saraiva 2005), but these were also under construction through the following two administrations.

After some hesitation during the first year, the Maluf administration also started to develop slum upgrading projects within the Guarapiranga project, the large-scale environmental program signed in the last days of the administration. This reached 8,000 families in 222 favelas (Uemura 2000) and, similarly to the Cingapura,

would continue to be developed throughout the next two administrations (Pitta and Suplicy).

These programs led to the formation of a different group of technicians that would be responsible for slum urbanization policies during conservative governments. Therefore, slum upgrading would be developed in the following decades by two different and only partially related networks of technicians, professionals and activists, but that could be mobilized and enable implementation in governments of different ideological affiliation.

The mayor managed to elect as successor his secretary of finances Celso Pitta (RW, 19967-2000, PPB). This government was marked by deep economic and fiscal crisis and major political problems, including the imprisonment of the mayor and his return to office by the courts. In terms of slum upgrading policies, Pitta continued the Cingapura and the Guarapiranga projects, completing 12,266 housing units and upgrading 75 favelas with 8,500 families, but also leaving other 4,439 housing units under construction (Marques and Saraiva 2005). A third program called Procav dedicated to channeling small rivers impacted approximately 1,500 families in 7 upgraded favelas located in in rived beds (Samora 2009). During these administrations, therefore, the importance of multi-level politics is specially evident, with important participation of a multilateral organization in the creation of resilience for slum upgrading policies.

In 2001, the Worker's party returned to power with Marta Suplicy (leftwing, 2001-2004, PT). The new administration did not interrupt Cingapura – indeed this would construct around 1,000 units until the end of this government -, but recreated the slum upgrading program instituted during the Erundina administration with similar or even broader characteristics. This new program was named Bairro Legal in intended to produce not only upgrading, but also land regularization and reinforcement in the infrastructure and equipment of the surrounding neighborhoods, although this ambition was not achieved (Rubio and Alvim 2013). A total of 90 favelas with approximately 140,000 families were impacted by both Bairro Legal and Guarapiranga, now renamed as Manaciais (São Paulo 2004). These activities were developed by many technicians that had worked during the Erundina government and stayed in civil society (academia, professional organizations and social movement) in the previous

two governments, as well engaged in other municipal administrations of the same party.

These programs were in general maintained during the next administration of José Serra (CRW, 2005-2006, PSDB), although with less intensity. In fact, the government was very short and lasted for little more than a year. His deputy mayor Gilberto Kassab (CRW, 2006-2012, PSD) completed the term and was later reelected for a new term. Although these governments did not produce a complete dismantling of existing agencies, most of the technicians involved in the Suplicy government went again to other municipalities and civil society. The Kassab administration experienced the best political and fiscal environment among all the governments of the period, due to the federal investments in urban policy by the Lula and Dilma presidencies (LW, PT). During the period, 21 favelas were upgraded, benefitting around 20,000 inhabitants, but with various types of interventions. Other 43 favelas with 65,605 inhabitants still had works at the transition period to the next mayor (São Paulo 2012). This administration innovated in the form of contracting slum upgrading design projects, developing open competitions organized by professional associations, as well as expositions of the constructed projects in high profile architectural events such as the Biennale di Venezia, as a strategy for creating visibility for its actions. Therefore, the relevance of multi-level politics is evident also in the government for the creation of policy resilience, with the presence of the federal government.

The Fernando Haddad government (LW, PT), finally, started in 2013, marking a new return of the Worker's party to the executive office of São Paulo. Differently from previous left-wing administrations, during its first years, the housing sector was controlled by a right-wing coalition partner, who relied on its own network of technicians. At the end of the government, in turn, key positions were occupied by PT members, bringing back the same network that had developed the policy previously. The political moment was not so favorable as the one experienced by the previous government. Although the municipal and the federal administrations were aligned (both PT), the national fiscal situation had deteriorated, and the mayor and the president didn't have the best possible relations (Haddad, 2017). Therefore, there were in fact much less resources from the federal government available to the

government. At the end, the government impacted 13 favelas with upgrading programs and left other 15 with works in progress (Sehab and Cohab 2016).

The following figure summarizes the policy trajectory:

Figure 1. Schematic representation of slum upgrading trajectory per government

Therefore, if we consider the trajectory of this policy over time, we can see its presence in almost all governments since Erundina, although with different intensities and designs. Its presence sometimes is explained by increased resilience due to multi-level politics, while in others involved the presence of different networks of professionals responsible for its management and implementation. In general terms, the policy imposed itself through time, although with different formats and intensities:

b.   Cooperative self-help housing – oscillating with latency

Other policies experienced quite different trajectories. Cooperative self-help is probably one of their best examples. Self-help construction has been a traditional form of housing construction in peripheries all over the country since the 1960s at least. Most houses in favelas and irregular settlements were in fact constructed by their own inhabitants, many of them civil construction workers themselves, sometimes involving

broader community mobilization and in others just extended family collective processes (Kowarick, 1979; Lopes, 2011).

In mid-80s, housing movements started to organize slum upgrading and housing construction with collective self-help, influenced by experiences of Uruguayan labor union cooperatives and aided by architecture professionals and professors (Lopes, 2011). This practice evolved for the formation of public policy programs in which movements formalized their associations, signed agreements with municipal governments (and were latter audited by them), in exchange for receiving monthly preapproved transfers for project design and construction (including the acquisition of supplies and renting equipment). The associations were aided in the process by architectural and engineering offices previously linked to the movements hired by them using municipal resources. In these programs the whole management of project design, construction and accounting was done by the associations in a strong cooperative style.

The municipality of São Paulo was one of the pioneers this kind of program, although departing from other small-scale experiences linked to architectural labs in universities (Lopes, 2011). These experiences circulated between municipalities but did not enter municipal policies during the Covas (CRW, 1983-1985, PSDB) nor Jânio Quadros (RW, 1986-1988, PTB).

They would become, however, one of the cornerstones of the Erundina administration (LW, 1989-1992, PT). Even more than slum upgrading programs, the coop self-help program had to be created really from scratch, establishing administrative and legal procedures for registering housing associations, rules for processing payments and for auditing their work, as well as standards for architectural and infrastructure projects. The program was created basically by activists, academics and professionals previously associated with housing movements who came to occupy positions at the municipal administration. The program benefited around 12,200 families, with 5,000 units already finished and 7,200 housing units under construction when the government ended (Amaral 2002, Barbosa 2008).

The following administration of Paulo Maluf (RW, 1993-2000, PPR/PPB) extinguished the program and dismantled the sector. The situation was maintained during the following government of Celso Pitta (RW, 1997-2000, PPB), who belonged

to the same political group. Most of the staff involved in its development went to other municipal governments of the same party, back to the academia, professional associations or social movements. Through these two governments, around 3,200 units among the ones under construction at the end of the Erundina administration ended up being completed and delivered, due to strong and long mobilizations of housing movements. No other units were initiated (Amaral, 2002).

The following government of Marta Suplicy (LW, 2001-2004, PT) marked the reestablishment of the program, with the return of a substantial part of the technicians, activists and professionals involved in the policy during its creation. During this administration, previous constructions were resumed and others were started, allowing the conclusion of 7,447 units and leaving another 5,075 units under construction when the government finished (Sehab 2004).

The next two administrations of José Serra (CRW, 2005-2008, PSDB) and Gilberto Kassab (CRW, 2009-2012, DEM/PSD) also represented strong political and administrative continuity. The staff responsible for the program in Suplicy administration again left the municipality. In fact, most of the municipal housing policy was made through agreements with a state level housing company, controlled by the same political group, especially after Serra became the governor. It is interesting to add, though, that federal programs were also central. In this case, although the federal government was certainly not aligned with the mayor, the PT presidencies had strong links to the housing movements themselves, as well as to this policy solution, developed nationally from its migration from municipal government experiences of the same party. It was in this context that a version of the Minha Casa Minha Vida program for housing associations (MCMV Entidades) delivered 3,838 units until 2012 (Sehab and Cohab 2016). Therefore, the small policy resilience present in this case is due to both multi-level and political alliances, even if unmatching political parties in power.

The next administration represented the third return of PT to local government in São Paulo with Fernando Haddad (LW, 2013-2016, PT). In this case, coalition formation at the local Council gave control of the housing secretary for a right-wing party during most of the government. Therefore, although technicians and activists returned to the local administration in many policies, most of them stayed outside housing until the last year. In any case, self-help housing continued to be delivered

through the Minha Minha Vida Entidades and until its end the administration had contracted around 4,300 units (Sehab and Cohab 2016), despite the profound financial and political federal crisis experienced since 2015 until the president's impeachment in 2016.

The following figure summarizes the policy trajectory:

Figure 2. Schematic representation of cooperative self-help housing

Summarizing, this program presented a clear swinging trajectory, being developed when the left was in power and halted when the right and centre-right won the mayors' office. This was in part compensated only once, when the federal government was occupied by the left (and mayor was centre-right). When intense municipal programs were in place, the policy depended on embedded civil society presence with a network of technicians, academics and activists that occupied positions in the government.

Bus transportation

The next two cases are associated with transportation policies in São Paulo, a city that historically prioritized private cars and is haunted by major traffic problems. These programs aimed respectively at the constitution of an integrated bus system (that later became connected with the subway) and the construction and maintenance of dedicated lanes and corridors for buses.

To give a broad picture of the transportation problems to be faced, it is enough to know that São Paulo is a very large metropolis with more than 20 million inhabitants, where the population grew 6.6% between 2007 and 2017 while motorized trips grew 12.8% and the vehicle fleet grew 28.8% (Metrô, 2019). As a result, the average speed in the morning and in the afternoon traffic was 24.8 and 18.5 kms per hour in 2017, respectively,[6] although much lower in high traffic roads, generating daily traffic jams of over 250 kilometers.[7]

Additionally, among motorized trips (not considering trips made on foot or on bicycles), private automobiles were responsible for 40.1%, buses for 37% and the subway and trains just for 16.4% (Metrô, 2019), turning bus transportation into a crucial issue for mayoral politics (since it is a municipal responsibility, differently form the subways and trains). However, buses compete for street space with cars (and traffic jams), so just adding more buses for public transportation is not an alternative, and can even worsen the problem. The two policy solutions presented below represent different (but compatible) strategies to optimize the transportation system. In the case of bus integration, this optimization leads to a reorganization of lines that can even reduce the number of buses, although with increased efficiency. In the case of the corridors and lanes, however, the redistributive feature of the policy is intrinsic, since it realocates street space from general use (including cars) to just buses through rules, physical segregation and enforcement tools (cameras, for example). For this reason, this policy is intrinsically conflictive and not surprisingly policies for city traffic and transportation are among the most debated and mobilized politically.

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[6] http://www.cetsp.com.br/sobre-a-cet/relatorios-corporativos.aspx, consulted in 10/02/2019.
[7] https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/infograficos/congestionamentos-sao-paulo/, consulted in 10/02/2019.

c.   Creating an integrated bus system - oscillating with increased institutionalization and agenda presence

In this case I summarize and discuss the trajectory of the formation of an integrated bus system in São Paulo, that involves at least three redistributive programs presented at Table 1 – improve lines, control over lines and creation of the smart card.

The bus system in São Paulo has a size and complexity compatible with the city. In 2018, 13,000 vehicles belonging to 32 private companies circulated in 1,300 bus lines, delivering around 6,400 daily scheduled trips (Campos, 2020). For many decades, bus transportation has been provided by private companies chosen in public bids, although rules and regulations changed substantially through time.

Historically, buses were central to the expansion of the city and for the sprawl of its urban tissue. Since 1946, services were provided by a municipal company CMTC (Companhia Municipal de Transportes Coletivos) and by private contractors who explored specific lines. Private companies were initially peripheral, but gradually became predominant, and from just 17 companies in 1946 they became 95 in 1961 (Henri and Zione, 1999), providing 80% of the daily trips in 1966 (Campos, 2020). The remuneration of the services was "direct", following the "service cost", a model that did not include any subsidy nor compensation between companies. During the military period, the federal government introduced changes in the regulation of the sector with the elaboration of national and metropolitan plans and the creation of a subway company and a metropolitan planning agency in São Paulo. These had very few effects over the bus system, though.

At the beginning of our period, the Mario Covas government (CRW, 1983-1985, PMDB) audited 13 of the 38 São Paulo bus contractors and after that reformulated payment procedures, but without changing the structure of the system. The Jânio Quadros administration (RW, 1986-1988, PTB) did not introduce any changes, except for the polemic introduction of London like double-decker buses, which would be soon dismissed since they would require reorganizing vertical street equipment completely, becoming museum pieces before circulating.[8]

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[8] https://cultura.estadao.com.br/blogs/curiocidade/sao-paulo-ja-teve-onibus-londrinos/, consulted in 10/02/2019.
https://www.tripadvisor.com.br/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g303631-d2350274-i128662289-Museu_dos_Transportes-Sao_Paulo_State_of_Sao_Paulo.html, consulted in 10/02/2019.

The next administration of Luiza Erundina (LW, 1989-1992, PT) was the first one to introduce major changes, including the circulation of additional 2300 buses (Campos, 2016). First the government tried (and failed) to introduce free fares financed by a progressive land tax,[9] what would be a major redistributive policy, considering the social composition of bus users and the patterns of residential segregation. Since that period, zero fare policy was the subject of many political mobilizations, especially in 2013 (Alonso and Mische, 2017). The Erundina administration then reorganized the system through new contracts in 1991 for both private companies and the municipal company CMTC, hired for specific lines. Fare resources were centralized in a fund that included both fares and municipal budget resources, ending the remuneration by the cost. Payments started to be calculated by a formula that weighted both kilometers traveled and transported passengers, calibrated to cover operational costs but to incentivize getting passengers (Campos, 2016). The administration was impacted by many conflicts involving strikes of both CMTC and private companies' employees (Couto, 1994).

The next mayor, Paulo Maluf (RW, 1993-1996, PPR/PPB), inverted the logic of policy transformations in the sector, but also introduced technical changes that would generate unexpected results later. The government started by privatizing the municipal company, selling buses, garages and lines in public bids. The remaining structure of the company was renamed into SPTrans and was reorganized to become a transportation regulatory agency. Due to the bids, the number of private companies providing lines jumped from 32 in 1992 to 63 in 1999 (Campos, 2020). Payments for contractors were again restricted to fare revenues, sharing them within each group of lines proportionally to their costs.

As a result, fares were appreciated, opening room for intense competition with clandestine van services that grew offering unregulated flexible lines at cheaper prices, especially during the following government of Celso Pitta (RW, 1997-2000).[10] Also in this administration, the municipality started the introduction of automatic fare charge with electronic cards and electronic turnstiles, in order to reduce costs and tariff

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[9] https://tarifazero.org/category/cronologia-transporte-erundina/, consulted in 10/02/2019.
[10] https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff2601200028.htm, consulted in 10/02/2019.

evasion by replacing the fare collectors so typical of Brazil municipal buses.[11] Bus workers went on strike and managed to maintain the collectors, creating the strange copresence of two charging forms in many buses. However, this infrastructure would become strategic for important changes introduced in the next government, evidencing the importance of policy instruments and tools for policy resilience.

The following administration of Marta Suplicy (LW, 2001-2004, PT) concentrated the largest amount of changes in the São Paulo bus system. The government used the fact that the existing contracts were ended and organized new bids and contracts in 2001 with a completely different logic. The new system was named Integrated System, and segmented services as structural and local, assigning to each of them different characteristics in terms of equipment, frequency and investment capacity.

The new contracts involved concessions for private companies (10 to 15 years) for the structural subsystem and permissions for cooperatives (7 to 10 years) for the local subsystem. Clandestine vans drivers had to form cooperatives to explore local lines, what improved their services substantially, but also concentrated power on cooperatives leaders, turning them in de facto companies (Hirata, 2011). Instead of the 51 companies and hundreds of clandestine drivers that operated lines in 2001, the city ended up with 18 companies and 11 cooperatives (Campos, 2015). The centralization of fare collection in a municipal fund was maintained, redistributing payments proportional to transported passengers. The Integrated System assumed an optimization of the existing system with the reorganization of lines, the creation of 93 bus terminals and 325 transferring stations, the construction of new corridors and the reform of existing ones (see next section), as well as the enforcement of higher service standards such as prohibition for the circulation of buses older than 10 years.

The changes of infrastructure introduced in the Pitta administration to reduce costs – the electronic cards and turnstiles - were used as a basis for a large expansion of electronic tools that improved the service substantially. Electronic validators and turnstiles were universalized, and a real smart card (*Bilhete Único*) was introduced allowing temporal fares and free integration between buses. This was complemented

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[11] https://diariodotransporte.com.br/2019/06/18/fim-cobradores-onibus-sp-noticias/, consulted in 10/02/2019.

with several monitoring technologies such as a control centre, GPS on buses and electronic line controls, creating overall legibility over the flows of passengers, buses and fares (Campos, 2016). Passengers could now change an unlimited number of times between buses within a period of two hours paying one single fare, a major redistributive measure considering the social profile of bus users and the large distances poor people travel in Brazilian cities.[12]

The two following terms of José Serra (CRW, 2005-2006, PSDB) and Gilberto Kassab (CRW, 2006-20012, PSD) did not introduce major changes in the system. The most important change was the integration of the smart card with the subway, although with the payment of an additional, but discounted, fare. During the Kassab government companies and cooperatives were urged to convert their vehicles to less pollutant fuel, going mainly from diesel to biodiesel and ethanol, as well as expanding the presence of buses with improved accessibility. This administration also implemented measures to reduce frauds with the card (Campos, 2016).

The last government of our period of Fernando Haddad (LW, 2013-2016, PT) started with a strong emphasis in transportation.[13] The administration replaced the technology of the smart cards, allowing for the creation of different temporal modalities valid for a day, a week and a month. Companies were urged to renovate the buses, including wifi and air conditioning. The data of bus GPS was public released, being used by mobility cellphone apps. After the 2013 street mobilizations, that started in São Paulo with youth mobilizations over the bus fare (Alonso and Mische, 2017), the municipality created free bus fares for students of public schools. Using the previsilibity produced by the combination of electronic accumulated through several governments, the municipality created a network of 151 nightlines. Finally, with the aim of reducing travel times (and operational costs), the administration proposed the creation of 150 kms of corridors and 150 kms of dedicated lanes, that at the end

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[12] It must be added that integrated bus fare proposals had already been presented by the PT mayoral candidate Eduardo Suplicy (at the time married with the future mayor Marta Suplicy), who was defeated in 1993 at the end of Erundina's term. It was also approved as a municipal law proposed by Carlos Zarattini and vetoed by the mayor Paulo Maluf in 1995. Zarattini was a PT councilman at that time, but would become Marta Suplicy's secretary of transportation in the creation of the smart card in 2004.
[13] https://jornalggn.com.br/sites/default/files/documentos/programa_de_governo_haddad.pdf, consulted in 10/02/2019.

became just 6 kms of corridors and 340 kms of dedicated lanes, due to the 2015 crisis (see next section).

The following figure summarizes the policy trajectory:

Figure 3. Schematic representation of bus integrated system trajectory per government

Therefore, the construction of an integrated bus system in São Paulo involved at least three different redistributive programs in Table 1, targeted to improve and control buses and to create the smart card. Although incrementally and with different intensities, this policy imposed itself through time, accumulating changes incrementally with the aid of elements that reinforced its institutionalization such as policy instruments and tools. This was reinforced by several articulated policy instruments that in this case became entrenched in the physical structure of the services (buses and turnstiles).

d. Bus corridors/dedicated lanes - oscillating with latency

Programs for construction of isolated corridors or dedicated bus lanes were implemented in São Paulo during the 1970s, although in a slow and intermittent manner. As already mentioned, both corridors and dedicated lanes are policy solutions developed to generate more fluency for buses, but they do this by redistributing street space, generating conflicts intrinsically. They differ in terms of resilience, efficiency and

cost, however. Dedicated lanes are usually located on the right lane (in countries with left-hand driving) and involve just soft physical lane separation, like pavement markings or continuous rumble strips. Due to that, they are cheap and fast to create, but are also much less resilient and can be removed more easily. Policy institutionalization in this case is enhance by the physical characteristics of the policy. They are also less effective, since cars and other vehicles are allowed to cross the lane to turn on streets to the right, reducing the average speed of buses.

Bus corridors, on the other hand, are usually located on the left (in countries with left-hand driving) and so buses suffer not interferences, except from traffic lights. They usually involve the physical separation of the lane with hard continuous barriers and therefore involve much higher construction costs, although are more resilience to policy changes. Buses are adapted for getting on and off on the left, directly from stations where passengers wait after usually paying outside of the vehicle. This allows the separation of payments from boarding, reducing stopping times. Bus rapid transit system (BRT), such as the ones that became worldly famous in Curitiba, Brazil, and much later the TransMilenio in Bogotá, Colombia, are specific cases of bus corridors (Almeida, 2019). In São Paulo only a small part of the system is strictly a BRT, but the concepts of this system are present in bus corridors since the early 2000s.

Therefore, this program involves two combined solutions – corridors and dedicated lanes. The first bus corridor was built in 1980 with 3.9 Km length, as a late (and minor) result of the 70s planning system of military governments for the metropolitan region of São Paulo (Almeida, 2019).

The first mayor of our period - Mario Covas (CRW, 1983-1985, PMDB) - started the planning and the works of a large North-South corridor of 15 km that would be finished by the next mayor, Jânio Quadros (RW, 1986-1988, PTB), curiously a public critic of this kind of solution (Almeida, 2019). The following administration of Luiza Erundina (LW, 1989-1992) added other 14 kms of corridors.

Paulo Maluf did not construct any, but his ally and successor Celso Pitta (RW, 1997-2000, PPB) constructed a new 6 kms corridor towards the South. Pitta in fact had been elected with the promise of constructing a very long elevated BRT line (*Fura Fila*) with originally 125 kms of extension, but that would stay under construction during

the next three administrations.[14] According to some, this project intended much more to benefit construction and equipment private contractors than solve the problem of mobility.[15] In any case, it is interesting to add, following Almeida (2019), that this elevated solution avoids the redistributive conflicts associated with arbitrating the conflict between individual cars and buses over street space, apparently turning a redistributive policy into a distributive one, to use Lowi (1964)'s distinction. For our analysis of the production of redistributive urban policies, therefore, solutions like this are only partial.

The following administration marked the return of the left to the municipality with Marta Suplicy (LW, 2001-2004, PT), and constructed the largest number of corridors – 70 kms, adding five new corridors and reforming three of the existing four, converting them to the new technological pattern (the *Passa Rápido* program). The BRT system that started in the previous administration was also continued with a different denomination (*Paulistão*) and changes in design that reduced its length to 22,8 kms and integrated it with subway stations and existing or planned street level corridors. The previous logic of constructing isolated and radial corridors was replaced by a network logic associated with the reorganization of the bus system already mentioned in the previous section.

The very short administration of José Serra (CRW, 2005-2006, PSDB) did not construct corridors, but his ally and successor Gilberto Kassab (CRW, 2006-2012, PSD) built 1,5 of a new corridor in a central area and finished the previously mentioned BRT, once more renamed as *Expresso Tiradentes.* This was replanned for 31.8 kms, but was latter concluded with just 9.7 kms.[16]

Fernando Haddad (LW, 2013-2016, PT), finally, was elected with the promise of constructing 150 kms of corridors and other 150 kilometers of dedicated lanes, mainly relying on the possibility of receiving federal resources, at that time controlled by the same party. After six months in office, the mayor faced massive demonstrations that spread through the country with many demands, but that started in São Paulo around the bus fare. This may in fact have helped the mayor, by lowering the costs of

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[14] https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2018/09/bilionario-fura-fila-de-sp-faz-20-anos-e-segue-isolado-subutilizado-e-incompleto.shtml, consulted in 10/02/2019.
[15] http://www.troleibusbrasil.hpg.ig.com.br/page4.html, consulted in 10/02/2019.
[16] http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/SaoPaulo/0,,AA1412270-5605,00.html, consulted in 10/02/2019.

implementing redistributive transportation programs already present in his electoral agenda. However, the intense political and economic crisis that took the country over after 2015 almost completely halted the arrival of federal resources. As a result, only 6 kms of corridors were constructed and most originally planned corridors were transformed into dedicated lanes, with a substantially lower cost (Almeida, 2019).

The second part of this policy involved the construction of dedicated lanes. These also date from the 1970s, but are more difficult to track, since they can be converted back, as already mentioned. In any case, departing from maps of the location of dedicated lanes that may informs about their stock, Almeida (2019) sustains that there were 51 kms of lanes at the beginning the 80s. Around 15 years later, during the Celso Pitta administration (RW, 1997-2000, PPB), they occupied only 42 kms. In the following administration of Marta Suplicy (LW, 2001-2004, PT) they reached 58 kms and Gilberto Kassab (CRW, 2006-2012, PSD) around 90 kms, so we can guess that the former government constructed 16 kms and the latter (together with the Serra government that came before it) around 32 Kms, although less than half of them became really operational (Almeida, 2019). The largest expansion of dedicated lanes happened in the Fernando Haddad administration (left, 2013-2016, PT), when they reached 430 kms, suggesting the construction of at least 340 kms of dedicated lanes. These represented the ones already included in the mayors' electoral program but added to the corridors that could not be financed and were converted.

It is important to add that since the Suplicy administration both corridors and lanes have been increasingly associated with instruments and technologies of control over flows (Campos, 2016) linked the already mentioned Integrated system.

Considering both dedicated lanes and corridors, the mayors that did more were Suplicy (70 kms of corridors and 16 of dedicated lanes), Haddad (6 kms of corridors and 340 of dedicated lanes) and Kassab (11 kms of corridors and 32 kms of dedicated lanes), although in the last case most are the elevated BRT, already under construction for four administrations and elevated, escaping from the redistributive logic of the conflicts around street space. Maluf did not construct any infrastructure of the sort, Serra continued the elevated BRT and Covas planned a long corridor that was finalized by Quadros, while Erundina planned and constructed its own corridor. Summarizing:

The following figure summarizes the policy trajectory:

Figure 4. Schematic representation of dedicated lanes and corridors per government[17]

Therefore, the establishment of this program oscillated through time. Concentrating our attention on the conflictive redistributive solutions (street level corridors and dedicated lanes), left-wing governments (Suplicy, Haddad and Erundina) built most of corridors and dedicated lanes, seconded by the Covas administration (CRW). Even considering the non-conflictive BRT solution, the prevalence of the left is still clear. During other governments, these solutions were strongly reduced or transformed into a different program. They did not die, however, and went into latency, to be reanimated by the next friendly administration. Civil society actors and activists migrated back and forth to the government, helping to implement the policy in certain governments and saving the policy solutions in civil society during others. And the physical structure of corridors contributed for policy resilience.

Conclusion

This article analyzed urban policy trajectories in São Paulo, which since the return to democracy have been marked by a conflictive, but incremental process of production of redistributive urban policies. Departing from results of previous

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[17] In this case, the corridor planned in the Covas government and concluded in the Quadros administration was divided.

research, I argued that this trajectory can be explained by a combination of political competition with policy process mechanisms. As we saw, however, policies differed in their trajectories, with some policies imposing themselves gradually through time and presenting more resilience, while others oscillated between implementation, latency and reanimation.

Through the article, we discussed the details of these two types of trajectories, by comparing four policies, two of the housing sector and two of the transportation sector. In each of the sectors I choose a policy with a stable trajectory and another one with an oscillating one. As we saw, for policies that presented stable trajectories of expansion, multilevel politics played an important role, since it contributed to policy resilience by providing stable financial resources (inherited by the previous administration and earmarked), as well as to policy institutionalization in administrative structures and policy instruments that tended to stay from one government to the other.

On the other hand, many policies oscillated but did not disappear, going into latency. A key element on this was the storage of solutions and knowledge during hostile governments in other local governments or in civil society, on the hands of policy advocates, academics and militants who migrated back and forth to municipal agencies depending on which party was in power. This trajectory of policy change is not accounted for by the existing models of policy production and can be explained only by the combination of elements from the politics of policies and from policy processes themselves, mostly associated with multi-level politics, institutionalization and civil society embeddedness.

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