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The case of UFBA**

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Social Inclusion in Brazilian Universities: the case of UFBA

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In 1996, during an ANPOCS [Brazilian Association of Postgraduate Programs and Research in Social Sciences] roundtable which debated the possibility of the implementation of affirmative actions for black people at Brazilian universities, we heard two arguments which would be repeated over the following years in various forms. The first, put forward by Carlos Hasenbalg, was that if these programs were implemented there would be serious problems with regard to their applicability, since the boundaries between groups of colour in Brazil are very flexible; the second, put forward by Fábio Wanderley Reis, stated that whereas the class struggle ideology had a libertarian nature, as classes would be abolished once the proletariat reached power, ethnic-racial policies, when implemented, tended to fix colour groups, instead of dissolving them into the nation: that is, classes have a dialectic whose characteristic was that of being superseded; races do not. During the debate that followed, a professor in the audience asked a question which reflected everyone's fears: would not the quality of Brazilian public universities fall to the standard of secondary public schools from where beneficiaries of affirmative actions were expected to come from?

At this event, one of the authors of this text (Guimarães 1996) argued that if frauds sabotaged affirmative actions, these policies would in fact have to be abandoned, but he believed that the colour groups in Brazil were relatively stable and, in theory, we should not expect the number of frauds to be any higher than those that occur in relation to policies aimed at the low income population, for example. With regard to Reis' argument, Guimarães (1996) doubted, above all, whether it was possible to maintain the belief that we are a racially homogeneous nation when clearly we never have been.

Ten years have passed since that roundtable and we now have data with which to assess the policies of affirmative actions for black people at Brazilian universities, implemented since 2003. In this presentation we will revisit the considerations brought up in 1996 and re-assess them in light of historical experience. In an initial

assessment, the first two arguments have shown themselves to be clearly unfounded in view of the fact that lack of rigidity of categories did not stop universities implementing affirmative actions for black people, nor did these categories become any more rigid or fixed with time. Is there, however, a kernel of truth in these arguments? If so, what would this be?

By using student entry data from three universities (UFBa [Federal University of Bahia], Unicamp [University of Campinas], and USP [University of São Paulo]), we intend to show that important adjustments had to be made so as to be able to use the self-declaration of colour in the selection of candidates - both in the establishment of commissions for verifying these declarations and the introduction of other benefit criteria. In the same way, these policies ended up by inducing a large number of students to declare themselves *pretos*¹ or *pardos*, even if this trend of reclassification is a phenomenon which predates the debate about quotas and has been taking place since the 1980s. That is, the boundaries between groups of colour have become more flexible and not more rigid. Also, by looking at data from UFBa we will show that beneficiaries of these policies have comparable academic performance to the rest of the students.

The different access policies that benefit blacks and their legitimacy

In 2009, Machado e Silva (2009) reported that 33 Brazilian public universities had selection processes which benefited black students (*pretos* and *pardos*) by reserving places (30), by awarding bonuses on marks (2) or by offering extra places (1). Simultaneously these universities, however, also benefited some other group: students that had gone to public schools at secondary level, indigenous students, students with physical disabilities, *quilombola* students, students from low income backgrounds, those resident in the regions (outside the state capital). The fact is that none of them had established an affirmative action policy solely for the benefit of black students.

The system for the selection of black students could be part of a process of parallel selection as is the case at UnB [University of Brasília] where there is three different admission process: (a) a special selection system for blacks (10% of total

¹ Negros - all individuals of color including mixed race individuals of all types
Pretos - Dark of Black individuals of African Descent
Pardos - Dark or Brown individuals

places, which is equivalent to 20% of places filled through the *vestibular* [Brazilian university entrance examination]); (b) an universal *vestibular* selection (40% of places) and (c) a selection based on the assessment of secondary school students (50% of places). The system can also combine two or more criteria, such as in UFBA, where 45% of places are reserved for students who attended a public secondary school (6,5% reserved without ethnic consideration, 36.5% for blacks or 2% for those of indigenous descent); or as in the case of Unicamp which gives a 30 point bonus to students who have attended public school and an extra 10 points if they are also black.

Coincidentally or not, universities that combine other criteria with colour, such as UFBA and Unicamp, do not monitor the self-declaration of candidates, but only the objective criteria to which it is associated, such as attending public schools at secondary level. Only some of those universities which use a separate selective process for blacks, for example UnB, have needed to establish some sort of verification with regard to the honesty of self-declaration. Thus, in a first assessment of the historical experience of the last six years, we can conclude that the concern manifested by Hasembalg in 1998 was not a mere chimera or simply an argumentative strategy - in practice, universities which established affirmative actions for blacks have tried to control the "sliding" of the colour categories.

In fact, this sliding seems to contaminate the colour self-declaration statistics of candidates registered at public universities. For example, see tables 1 and 2 below, showing students enrolled in the *vestibular* at UFBA and Unicamp respectively, from 2005 onwards, the year when both institutions start to benefit blacks. However, the increase in the number of self-declared blacks also seems to be part of a more general trend, and not something taking place in specific instances and driven by self-interest, as, firstly, it also appears in USP statistics, which do not benefit blacks in their *vestibulars* (see table 3), and secondly, it takes place in the population as a whole. As can be seen from table 4 there is a decreasing trend in the population to declare itself white - in favour of the *pardo*, *preto* and indigenous groups - something which has been ongoing since the 1990s

These data suggest that university authorities which combine a criteria of colour with school background in their policies of affirmative action, as well as yielding to the demands for racial justice or for the empowerment of the black population coming from sectors of the black political movement, are also moved by,

or seek justification in, ideals of social justice - that is, they have been attempting to increase the number of those recruited from public schools.

We believe that Brazilian public opinion has perfectly understood what the pro-quota movement was about. See, for example, how public opinion changes between 1995 and 2006 (Tables 5 and 6) towards an acceptance of racial quotas. What is most striking, however, is the fact that in specific questions asked for building opinion scales, the majority of the population seems to move, contradictorily, towards both the defence of selection by merit and by quotas, as can be seen from Tables 7 and 8. This movement leads us to suggest that, in face of government inertia, both during the FHC period, and in the first period of the Lula government, which preceded the *mensalão* scandal (2006), the pro-quota movement was the only one to propose a concrete solution for the educational crisis which was becoming worse due to the lack of public university places and the absence of a pro-active policy of grants for private universities.

The social virtue of affirmative action policies

In this section we will look more carefully at what has happened in the last six years at UFBA. The Federal University of Bahia is an exemplary case of an institution that has attempted, since 2004, to widen its student base, following not only criteria of academic merit, but also using social and racial justice criteria, with the aim to quickly and responsibly include students who come from socially disadvantaged backgrounds, but who have adequate educational standards for higher education.

There are currently three concomitant projects which were implemented chronologically: the implementation of a reserve of places for students from public schools, preferentially *pardos*, *pretos* and those of indigenous descent (from the 2005 *vestibular* onwards); the increase in the number of places through the creation of new campuses and courses in the regions outside the capital of the State of Bahia (since 2006); the introduction of new curriculums, new courses and an increase in places throughout all its campuses (from the present year, 2010).

The reserve of places which started with the 2005 *vestibular*, whose decree was approved by UFBA University Council in 2004, has the following structure, which we will briefly describe. The *vestibular* takes place in two stages. In the first stage, the exams assess all the subjects offered in the secondary school curriculum. These are elimination tests - multiple choice - and candidates are eliminated if they

are absent or if their mark in one of the tests is below the stipulated threshold, that is, if their partial score is less than the standard deviation of the mean (-1s) of the partial scores of all candidates who have not been eliminated through absence or by scoring zero. During the second stage, there are discursive examinations and subjects vary according to the area of knowledge (exact, biological and social sciences, languages and literature and arts). Here absent candidates or those who score zero in any of the exams are also eliminated. This second stage is classificatory, that is, those with the highest scores are offered a place until all places are filled, according to the rules of place reservation: 45% filled by students who attended secondary education in the public sector, 55% for the rest of the students. It is worth quoting in full the categories of students benefited by the system of reserve of places, as established by the Council Resolution 01/04, dated July 2004:

Category A (36.55%): public school candidates who declare themselves to be *preto* or *pardos*.

Category B (6.45%): public school candidates of any ethnicity or colour.

Category D (2%): public school candidates who declare themselves to be of indigenous descent.

Category E (55%): all candidates, who attended any school and of whatever ethnicity or colour.

6) If all places destined to Categories A and B are not filled, priority is given to candidates of private schools who declare themselves to be *pretos* or *pardos* (Category C). If there are any remaining places, they are to be filled by candidates enrolled in Category E.

7) If there are remaining places in Category D, they are to be filled by candidates enrolled in Category E."

What are the reasons that led UFBA to establish this system of quotas?

Without a doubt, the pressure of black movements had some weight, in conjunction with pressure from other social movements, and public opinion favourable to a greater opening of public universities to the lower middle classes. In 2004, 61% of those who passed the UFBA *vestibular* had already declared themselves to be *pardos* or *pretos* (see Table 1). The main argument of the social movements at the time was that in higher prestige courses such as medicine, law and engineering this proportion was less than 20%. In fact, the pioneering work of Queiroz (2003) counted, since 2001, 39% of students (63 out of 161) to be *preto* or *pardo* on the Medicine course at UFBA (see Table 9). The fact is that the 2005 decree attempted to benefit the two groups that were most mobilised by the democratization of university - blacks and secondary public school students.

The inclusion of black (*pretos* and *pardos*) students in proportion to their weight in the population of the state of Bahia was achieved by UFBA with the first *vestibular* with quotas in 2005. The proportion of blacks admitted to the university reached 73.4% in 2005 and the number of whites fell to 21.2%.

"The percentages of whites and *pardos* admitted through the 2005 selection process are equivalent to what these groups represent in the population of the State of Bahia, according to *IBGE* [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics] data. 1. *IBGE* data show that 21% of the Bahia population is made up of whites (21.2% in UFBA); 12.7% are *pretos* (16.9% at UFBA); 65.8% are *pardos* (56.5% at UFBA); 0.5% (3.7% at UFBA) are indigenous and *amarelos*² That is, according to *IBGE*, 78.5% of the population of Bahia is represented by *pretos* and *pardos*, whereas in UFBA this group is represented by 73.4% of candidates. " (UFBA 2005).

The increase in the number of black students selected at UFBA was, however, part of a historical trend, comparable to what had been happening at other public universities in the country such as USP (Guimarães 2007) and Unicamp. The novelty, in the case of UFBA, was the marked increment made in recruiting blacks in 2005 (16 percentage points), proving that the policy of quotas very much accelerated this trend. The significant difference between the 2004 and 2005 percentages indicates that the 2005 level is above what would be expected from the historical trend of growth.

Statistics indicate that the UFBA *vestibular* became more democratic in that it selected students from less economically and culturally privileged social groups, becoming more sensitive to the social origin of its candidates. We shall return to this issue further on. For now, we will concentrate on the analysis of supply and demand of places at UFBA.

Places, supply and demand

The supply of places as well as the admission of new students in the federal higher education system, both in Salvador and throughout the Recôncavo da Bahia, remained stable between 2003 and 2006, with a gradual opening up of only 148 places during this period. Between 2006 and 2008, however, 1083 new places were created, equivalent to an increase of almost $\frac{1}{4}$ of places for the whole period (see Table 11). Up to 2005, UFBA only had a campus in Salvador, the state capital, with the exception of an agronomy course which was taught at Cruz das Almas, a city in

² Amarelo - "Yellow" or an individual of East Asian descent

the Recôncavo. In 2004, an Oceanography course was opened in Salvador (25 places) and, in the following year, three more new courses - Fishing Engineering, Forestry Engineering and Zoo technology - increasing supply by 50 new places. In 2006, however, UFBA launches a proactive policy of moving towards the regions. Its campus in Cruz das Almas becomes integrated to the recently created Universidade Federal do Recôncavo (UFRB) [Recôncavo Federal University], and it opens new campuses in Barreiras and Vitória da Conquista. In 2006, the federal system UFBA-UFRB increased supply by 714 places in total; in the following year, another 12 courses are offered in these (new) campuses, increasing the number of places to 1184.

With regard to supply at UFBA, the number of places remained almost the same in the capital at around 3900, whereas the main expansion of about three hundred places occurred in the regions of the state in the campuses of Barreiras and Vitória da Conquista.

Demand, however, decreased between 2003 and 2008 with significant oscillations during this period. It dropped sharply by almost 5,000 between 2003 and 2005, the year when the system of quotas was introduced; it increased in 2006, undoubtedly due to the incentive that quotas represented (almost 8,000 students applied for UFBA places), to fall again, spectacularly, in 2008, motivated by two factors: the increase in supply of places at UFRB (in 2008) and in private universities, stimulated by the vertiginous increase in the grants provided by Prouni [University for All Program]

As we have suggested, it seems that the introduction of quotas in 2005 strongly influenced the increase in demand in 2006. But from the start, in 2005, the demand for UFBA fell despite the opening of new courses and places. The courses with the highest demand such as Medicine, Law, Business Management, Psychology, Nursing, Dentistry and Pharmacy lost 3312 candidates, that is, 21% less candidates than in 2004. Other courses, such as Veterinary Medicine, Computer Sciences, Physical Education and Civil Engineering also lost a significant number of candidates, probably to the private universities in the Prouni system.

However, the decrease in 2007 (Table 13) is due almost entirely to the opening of the new public university in the Recôncavo and the greater number of grants available through Prouni. This phenomenon is so strong that it takes place in spite of the opening of UFBA campuses outside the capital, in the regions. That is, the demand

for courses offered by UFBA in Salvador fell sharply due to the competition of other higher education institutions, directly or through Prouni.

In fact, the number of Prouni grants offered in the municipality of Salvador almost tripled between 2005 and 2008, from 3831 to 10,739 (180% increase), the largest increase in supply took place between 2006 and 2007 (doubling the number of places from 3920 to 7780); whereas the Federal University of Recôncavo, which opened its doors in July 2006, was already offering 3,580 places in its four campuses in 2009 (Cruz das Almas, Amargosa, Cachoeira and Santo Antonio de Jesus). In fact the decrease in demand is concentrated in the courses in Salvador, especially those already mentioned, the most popular, as can be seen from Tables 12 and 13.

Thus we can say that UFBA - with the introduction of a quotas system in 2005 and the expansion of places by creating new campuses outside the capital of the State, from 2006 - took an active and decisive part in the democratization of access of students to higher education in Bahia This virtuous framework also encompasses the opening of UFRB in 2007 and the large increase in grants for private universities from 2005, and further accentuated in 2007.

From 2009, UFBA starts a real revolution, using REUNI resources in creating 47 new courses, increasing enrolment by 28%. If compared with 2000, in ten years UFBA more than doubles its number of places and its number of courses (see graphs 1, 2 and 3). It is expected that this new expansion will have a great impact on the admission of low income students, who have attended public secondary schools and black students As this expansion is based on short (three year) interdisciplinary undergraduate courses and as traditional careers will open up special selection procedures for students in these courses, it is fully expected that the democratization of federal higher education in Salvador will be furthered strengthened.

Change in the socio-economic profile of those admitted to courses

To assess the quotas system introduced by UFBA in 2005 we must first look at the changes in the socio-economic profile of those who passed this university's *vestibular*. As the program's objective was to principally benefit *preto* and *pardo* public school students through a place reservation system, it would be expected that the demographic composition of those admitted radically changed in 2005. To control the effect of a further affirmative action policy introduced shortly afterwards - the regionalization of the university - we will only analyse data from the courses offered

in the Salvador campus. Table 1, as we have seen, shows that what was expected did in fact occur: already in the first year of quotas, UFBA started to recruit the number of blacks which was practically equivalent to the relative number of blacks in the population of the state of Bahia. Better still: it started to recruit black students in practically the same proportion as black students enrolled in its *vestibular*. Indeed, in a slightly greater proportion, as year-on-year increasing numbers of new black students show. With a decrease in demand from 2007 onwards, when a large proportion of black candidates from public schools start to look for private universities using the Prouni scheme, the rate of admission of black students continues to grow.

The same is true of the percentage of those admitted who come from public schools (Table 14). Whereas in 2004 66% of those admitted by UFBA came from private schools, in 2005 this number falls to 49%. Here, however, the effect of greater supply and the appeal of Prouni are more strongly felt. From 2007, for example, the percentage of those admitted from private schools grows again, reaching 53% in 2008.

Does this suggest that the democratization policy, that is, attracting students from the lower classes, which initially took place through the quota system, is being offset by Prouni? Not necessarily. On the contrary, there are signs that this democratization has carried on. If we take as an example the family income as declared by students (Table 10), we see that the percentage of students coming from families with incomes over 20 minimum salaries continues to fall during this whole period, though not as quickly as it was expected to. The most important thing to note is that Prouni does not seem to have had the effect of re-eliticizing access to UFBA.

However family income, as declared by young adolescents, does not seem a very reliable indicator. In the same way, income is not a good indicator of social reproduction (the capacity of a social class to reproduce itself through generations). The education level of a candidate's mother has shown itself to be a more robust indicator, since it is less subjected to statement errors as well as directly measuring the education capital of the family.

If we look at the behaviour of this indicator it is possible to believe that the changes in the demand for higher education in Bahia - which have taken two directions, from Salvador to the regions and from public to private universities - could indeed have had the effect of re-eliticizing UFBA. In this case, however, not blocking

the entrance of black candidates, but selecting black and white students with greater education capital. For example: the percentage of students that come from families where the mother has completed higher education increases again, and the percentage of students from families where the mother has, at most, an incomplete primary education or even a complete secondary education decreases - although there is a minimal variation in this last case (see table 15).

Table 16 clearly shows that the increase in the number of students admitted who attended private school at secondary level applies to both white and black students equally. However, a more careful examination will show that the same table also indicates that those that benefited most from the movement of poorer students towards private universities and UFRB (as well as to the regional campuses of UFBA itself), have been black students who attended private schools (4 percentage points in 31). A movement which compensates the relative fall in the number of black students who attended public schools. The last column on table 16 shows the difference in percentage points between 2008 and 2007 for each combination of university students according to school and colour, confirming what we have just said.

Another sign of the unexpected influence of Prouni on UFBA could be the fact that the relative number of students admitted who work has fallen again in 2008, as well as the number of men admitted (see table 17). That is, it seems that those that decided not to sit the UFBA-Salvador *vestibular* and moved towards regional campuses or private universities were those who worked, in general men.

A more refined way of analysing these data -which relativizes these results, since it introduces important nuances by fixing comparison parameters - is to observe the candidates probabilities of admission according to different socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In this way, we have largely isolated some of the interferences which cloud our comprehension of what we should really be observing.

Probabilities show that, for example in 2006, with regard to being admitted through the *vestibular*, for every candidate coming from a family whose mother had completed primary school there were 1.86 candidates from a family whose mother had higher education (see Table 18). This probability fell to 1.56 in 2008. A black student from public school in 2005 had 60% less chance of passing the vestibular compared with a white student from a private school; with the quotas, his or her chances were 35% higher than a white person in a private school, whereas in 2008 he

or she had 74% more chance (1.74 black students from public schools were approved for each white person from private school).

Women, who in general have less chance of being admitted through these examinations than men, see their chances of winning a place only growing after the large movement away to private universities and to the regions; but even then, in 2008, they had 86% less chance than men in being admitted to UFBA, Salvador Campus.

Graphs 4,5,6, and 7 show the net effect of the introduction of quotas on the social-economic composition of those admitted through the UFBA *vestibulars*. It is a simple but revealing exercise: there were two groups, one made up of those that were approved in the *vestibular* at UFBA Salvador campus, and another made up of students who had the greatest scores in the sum of tests and who therefore would have been part of the first group, had it not been for the current quotas selection system. By establishing these two groups and comparing them, we can see the net effect of the quotas policy with regard to some key variables, such as colour, family income and social origin - measured either by the mother's education, or the father's occupation. From the graphs we can clearly see there is an increase in the admission of students with less social capital (measured through the variables of social origin), lower income, coming from public schools and blacks. Furthermore, the gap in income, colour and social origin decreases, that is, the university becomes more egalitarian and democratic. Those that most benefited from the introduction of quotas were students who came from federal public schools (Military College of Bahia, Cefet [Federal Technical High School]), the Military Policy High School, that is, those that came from the best public schools in Salvador, which is what would be expected.

Finally, we are still to find out if those quota students admitted to UFBA from 2005 onwards have been performing satisfactorily.

The performance of quota and non-quota students at UFBA

One of the main recurring criticisms against Affirmative Action policies implemented at UFBA and Unicamp from 2005 onwards was the prediction of a dramatic increase in drop-out rates, in all courses, with those that benefitted from the various systems of induced access (quotas and bonuses, respectively) being the most affected. Two arguments prevailed with regard to this catastrophic prediction: first, as these students come from low income families, often needing to work to survive, they

would lack the financial conditions to allow them to stay at university; second, students favoured by differentiated access systems, with lower educational levels as they had come from public schools, would have difficulties in succeeding on regular courses.

Analysis of data relating to UFBA dispels these fears. We have included in our study all those who entered UFBA between 2003 and 2008, a total of 23,880 students. The cohorts of 2003 and 2004 (7688 students) were taken as the control group, allowing for the assessment of the trend effects which could potentially interfere with the results. The main findings are summarized in the tables.

In Table 19 we can see two expected effects. First, students who were in the lower fifth of the scores on the University entrance selective process tend to improve their performance independently of the entrance cohort. Second, benefited students tended to present lower scores in their entrance examinations, with 71.3% (5240 students) placed in the 1st and 2nd fifths of the scale. Correspondingly, 61.6% of those who were not benefited (5448 students) are concentrated in the higher fifths (4-5) of the scale.

However, this same table reveals surprising results, from the point of view of the relative performance of the students who entered UFBA through Affirmative Action Programs. The majority (72%) of beneficiaries positioned in the lower fifth of the table show an improvement in their educational performance, significantly higher in comparison with non-beneficiaries (51%). Further, in all fifths, beneficiaries consistently obtained a better performance relative to their entrance score than non-beneficiaries, tending to balance out in the higher fifths of the scale.

In Table 20 we can see that course conclusion rates are reduced in recent cohorts because students need a greater amount of time to complete respective courses. For all cohorts, there are no differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the indicators with regard to course continuity, rates of conclusion and transfer, and dismissals and drop outs. Evidently these indicators are underestimated due to underreporting and late registration related to academic procedures. Nevertheless, it is clear that the variation in the indicators consistently occurs in equal measure for both groups being compared - beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The explanation for such positive results can be found in the refutation of the two factors put forward as the main thrust of criticism against the quotas regime at UFBA.

The first factor pointed out by critics implies a reasonable supposition, taking into account the contingent of students admitted through quotas, where more than 60% come from families with an average income of less than 2 minimum salaries. In this case, the findings of the present analysis can only attest to the positive impact of drop-out prevention strategies directed at the groups of students benefited by Affirmative Action policies (grants, increase in student accommodation, *Programa Permanecer*, etc.) that we have put in place at UFBA, within the context of REUNI, and which have proved to be efficient despite limits and omissions.

There is increasingly strong evidence, exemplified by data in Table 19, that the relative performance of students that have benefitted from place reservation is as good as that of those who have entered through general selection. In other words, data indisputably confirm the potential of young people coming from the lower classes who were systematically excluded from accessing quality higher education. Furthermore, the motivation of beneficiary students, when faced with the opportunity of higher education within a public institution of renowned quality, results in greater diligence, dedication and commitment in comparison with their colleagues from privileged socio-economic situations, protected by future career and professional guarantees.

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Tables

Table 1 - Black selected na UFBA-Salvador campus

YEAR	% Black		Selection rate	
	registred	selected	Black	White
2003	58,84%	55,4%	8,6%	10,2%
2004	66,75%	61,1%	9,3%	12,3%
2005	75,27%	74,5%	11,9%	12,6%
2006	74,43%	73,0%	9,6%	10,5%
2007	72,69%	71,9%	10,4%	11,2%
2008	71,37%	72,3%	12,6%	12,4%

Source: UFBA.

Table 2 – Unicamp, registred and selected by year e color

Ano	Inscritos			Aprovados em 2a. Chamada		
	total	brancos	negros	total	brancos	negros
2003	46492	81,0%	10,4%	13304	81,2%	9,0%
2004	50549	77,1%	13,6%	15157	78,6%	10,7%
2005	53775	71,3%	18,5%	12856	74,1%	13,6%
2006	49606	72,1%	17,1%	14911	75,1%	12,8%
2007	50219	72,5%	17,0%	14483	75,0%	12,6%
2008	49477	73,2%	16,8%	14428	75,4%	12,8%

Source: Convest - Unicamp

Table 3, Black registered e selected in USP

Year	Registered	% de Black	
		registred	selected
2001	144458	12,3%	7,0%
2002	146307	13,0%	7,7%
2003	161147	14,5%	8,5%
2004	157808	17,2%	9,7%
2005	154514	21,3%	11,5%
2006	170474	22,9%	11,1%
2007	142656	19,6%	11,8%
2008	140999	18,6%	12,0%

Source: Fuvest

Table 4 – Brazil: Population by Color, 1995, 2005, and 2008

Ano	Pop. Total	Couleurs			
		Branca	Preta	Parda	Amarelo Indígena
1995	151922545	54,5	4,9	40	0,6
2005	181000608	50,5	6,3	42,5	0,7
2008	189995300	48,8	6,5	43,8	0,9

Source: IBGE: PNAD

Table 5 – Opinion contrary to university's quotas in 1995 by some characteristics

Total	51,1
Whites	53,3
Blacks	48,5
Up to 10 MW	44,5
11 MW or more	63,8
Source: DataFolha 1995	

Table 6 – The approval of quotas for Blacks and poor people in education and work. Brazil, 2006

Respondent's educational level	Quotas in education	Quotas in work
Elementary	71%	73%
High School	65%	67%
Higher Education	42%	45%
Total	65%	68%

Source: DataFolha, 2006

Table 7 – DataFolha 2006: Quotas at universities should be created to poor and low-income people independent of race




Table 8 - DataFolha 2006: “Quotas for Black at universities are necessary to guarantee the access of all people to education”




Table 9 – Black students selected in UFBA vestibular, by school origin and career – 2001

Career	Private		State		Federal		City		Public No selected
	Select ed	No selec ted	Sele cted	No select ed	Select ed	No selec ted	Sele cted	No selec ted	
Medicine	59	121	4	6	2	8	-	3	17
Law	33	103	6	24	7	32	-	2	58
Odontology	20	87	1	6	1	5	-	-	11
Business	28	95	12	36	7	11	-	2	49
Computer Sciences	28	56	14	28	9	27	-	1	56
Eletrical Eng.	20	48	5	34	8	31	1	2	67
Psicology	14	62	4	15	2	12	-	1	28
Engeneering	25	81	4	64	10	43	2	4	111
Mechanical Eng.	13	43	5	35	15	21	-	7	63
Architecture	9	60	8	37	16	18	-	3	58
Chemical Eng.	9	46	8	38	16	18	-	2	58
Total	258	802	71	323	93	226	3	27	576

Source: UFBA; Queiroz (2001)

Table 10: Selected in UFBA by family income, 2003 a 2008

Renda familiar	YEAR					
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Até 3 SM	11,59%	14,72%	23,28%	27,21%	27,88%	27,83%
+3 A 5 SM	20,71%	18,70%	25,60%	23,94%	23,01%	23,71%
+5 A 10 SM	31,58%	29,48%	24,48%	23,93%	23,93%	22,57%
+10 A 20 SM	19,54%	20,67%	16,12%	15,16%	15,16%	16,24%
+ DE 20 SM	16,58%	16,42%	10,52%	10,02%	10,02%	9,65%

Source: UFBA.

Table 11 – UFBA-UFRB, 2003 a 2008, supply and demand

Year	Selected (First call)			Registered		
	Abs	Δ	Δ%	Abs	Δ	Δ%
2003	3845			38995		
2004	3892	47	1,22%	37839	-1156	-2,96%
2005	3986	94	2,42%	33060	-4779	-12,63%
2006	3993	7	0,18%	40319	7259	21,96%
2007	4672	679	17,00%	42719	2400	5,95%
2008	5076	404	8,65%	39211	-3508	-8,21%
período		1231	24,25%		216	0,55%

Source: UFBA, Centro de Processamento de Dados

Table 12 – UFBA, 2003 a 2008, supply and demand

Year	Selected			Registered in vestibular		
	(First call)					
	Abs	Δ	Δ%	Abs	Δ	Δ%
2003	3845			38995		
2004	3892	47	1,22%	37839	-1156	-2,96%
2005	3986	94	2,42%	33060	-4779	-12,63%
2006	3993	7	0,18%	40319	7259	21,96%
2007	4296	303	7,59%	40832	513	1,27%
2008	4229	-67	-1,56%	34957	-5875	-14,39%

Source: UFBA

Table 13: Supply and demand for UFBA, Salvador campus, 2003-2008.

Year	Selected (first call)	Registered in vestibular	Rate
2003	3845	38995	9,9%
2004	3892	37839	10,3%
2005	3968	33060	12,0%
2006	3973	40319	9,9%
2007	3938	38114	10,3%
2008	3887	32284	12,0%

Source: UFBA

Table 14: Selected na UFBA by school origin – 2003 a 2008

Year	City	State	Federal	Private	Total
2003	1,7%	23,2%	9,0%	61,5%	95,4%
2004	2,1%	20,4%	7,8%	66,2%	96,5%
2005	2,9%	36,5%	11,1%	49,0%	99,5%
2006	3,6%	37,1%	9,8%	48,9%	99,4%
2007	2,7%	36,5%	11,2%	49,1%	99,5%
2008	2,9%	32,9%	10,5%	53,4%	99,7%

Source: UFBA

Table 15: Selected by mother's schooling, UFBA 2003 a 2008.

Schooling	Year					
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1o. inc ou -	21,32%	18,13%	22,57%	22,60%	21,09%	18,91%
2o completo	44,68%	39,14%	44,10%	40,74%	40,68%	39,77%
Superior inc +	34,00%	42,73%	33,32%	36,66%	38,23%	41,32%

Source: UFBA.

A Table 16: Selected by School origin and color, UFBA 2003 a 2008

Categories of school-color	Year						2008-2007
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
White-Private	32,74%	29,93%	16,63%	17,65%	18,96%	19,14%	0,18%
White-Public	10,10%	6,41%	6,02%	5,98%	5,67%	4,88%	-0,79%
Black-Private	31,67%	38,82%	32,80%	31,93%	30,95%	34,69%	3,74%
Black-Public	25,48%	24,84%	44,55%	44,43%	44,43%	41,29%	-3,14%
TOTAL	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	0,00

Source: UFBA.

Table 17: Selected na UFBA – male and job rates

Year	Male rate	Job rate
2003	0,93	0,39
2004	1,03	0,26
2005	1,03	0,29
2006	1,03	0,32
2007	1,15	0,33
2008	0,99	0,28

Source: UFBA

UFBA - Capital Odds ratios de candidatos por características sociais

Todos os Cursos	Sem Cotas		Com Cotas			
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Renda Familiar						
Até 3 sm	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
de 3 a 5 sm	1,34***	1,37***	1,41***	1,28***	1,33***	1,25***
de 5 a 10 sm	1,46***	1,82***	1,68***	1,6***	1,83***	1,54***
de 10 a 30 sm	1,8***	2,3***	1,9***	1,67***	2,11***	1,98***
mais que 20 sm	2,14***	2,35***	2,07***	1,79***	2,45***	2,01***
Escolaridade da Mãe						
Até 5a completo	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Ensino Fundamental completo	1,09	1,06	1,05	1,24**	1,07	1,07
Ensino Médio Completo	1,24**	1,33***	1,33***	1,33***	1,31***	1,3***
Ensino Superior Completo	1,43***	1,93***	1,55***	1,84***	1,62***	1,56***
Raca e Ensino Médio						
Branco e Rede Privada	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Branco e Rede Pública	0,66***	0,61***	1,4***	1,28**	1,34**	1,34**
Negro e Rede Privada	0,88**	0,9**	1,01	0,88**	0,85**	0,94
Negro e Rede Pública	0,59***	0,6***	1,35***	1,39***	1,61***	1,74***
Escola no Ensino Médio						
Escola Comum	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Escola Técnica	1,16**	1,34***	1,06	1	1,04	1,07
Outras	0,56***	0,57***	0,72***	0,63***	0,64***	0,7***
Frequentou cursinho?						
Não	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Sim	1,17***	1,2***	1,26***	1,37***	1,4***	1,42***
Sexo						
Masculino	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Feminino	0,83***	0,79***	0,78***	0,8***	0,71***	0,86***
Candidato trabalha?						
Não	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Sim	0,81***	0,78***	0,72***	0,78***	0,8***	0,74***
Demanda						
Média	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Alta	0,26***	0,26***	0,39***	0,32***	0,33***	0,36***
Baixa	1,88***	1,72***	1,49***	1,68***	1,54***	1,59***

- 0,10 ** 0,05 ***0,01

Table 19: UFBA, Relative performance by quintiles of cohorts

Quartil do Escore de Entrada	Desempenho Relativo à Entrada(2008-2)	COORTES					
		2003-2004		2005-2008			
		N		N		N	Não-Beneficiários
			Todos		Beneficiários		
1	Menor	0	--	0	--	0	--
	Igual	371	.244	766	.281	212	.488
	Maior	1149	.756	1956	.719	222	.512
2	Menor	334	.217	518	.206	156	.216
	Igual	339	.220	639	.254	192	.266
	Maior	868	.563	1361	.540	374	.518
3	Menor	607	.396	329	.332	824	.367
	Igual	331	.216	231	.233	505	.225
	Maior	596	.388	431	.435	914	.408
4	Menor	877	.569	330	.520	1302	.500
	Igual	324	.210	138	.218	662	.254
	Maior	340	.221	166	.262	642	.246
5	Menor	994	.641	307	.640	1770	.623
	Igual	558	.359	173	.360	1072	.377
	Maior	0	--	0	--	0	--
TOTAL	--	7688	1.000	7345	1.000	8847	1.000


Source: UFBA

Table 20: UFBA, Drop-out of quota and no-quota beneficiaries


ANO	2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008	
	SITUAÇÃO DO ALUNO NO CURSO*	Todos	Todos	Não-beneficiários	Beneficiários	Não-beneficiários	Beneficiários	Não-beneficiários	Beneficiários	Não-beneficiários	Beneficiários	
Continua	29,5	56,4	74,00	73,34	79,83	80,56	96,96	96,80	99,37	99,39		
Jubilado/Desistiu	23,8	21,5	15,68	16,07	10,06	10,26	2,81	2,82	0,54	0,50		
Formado	42,6	18,8	5,89	5,92	0,34	0,59	-	-	-	-		
Mudou de curso	4,1	3,2	4,39	4,02	9,77	8,54	0,23	0,11	-	-		
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00		
N	3847	3841	2073	1842	2345	1862	2205	1843	2224	1798		

Gaphs:


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
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
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
Graph 4 - Projected/Actual Results of Mother's schooling



Graph 5 - Projected/Actual Results – Race



Graph 6 - Projected/Actual Type of High School





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